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HIGH COURT STUDY
A JUDGE IN FULL:
WALLACE JEFFERSON OF TEXAS
Michael Ariens*
During his eight years as Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme
Court, Wallace Jefferson has written a number of deeply engaging
opinions that illustrate his command of the work required of an
appellate judge.1 These opinions are both thorough and thoughtful,
and neither obtuse, nor shallow. They mark a judge well-versed in
jurisprudence and in the ongoing debates about how judges
construct and interpret statutes, the common law, and the
constitution. His opinions indicate both his confidence in his
conclusions and a humility cognizant of his fallibility. His opinions
have also occasionally generated objections, as Texas law has
changed during the past decade. Chief Justice Jefferson's opinions
reflect a judge in full; one who possesses a deep knowledge of law
and the peculiarities and particularities of the state and the people
he serves.
This essay discusses the work of Chief Justice Jefferson. His
work should be understood in light of the unusual division of
appellate power in Texas, as well as the shifting but exclusively
Republican composition of the membership of the Supreme Court of
Texas since during his service there.2
* Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. Thanks to Lauren Valkenaar for her
excellent research assistance. In the interest of full disclosure, then-attorney Wallace
Jefferson and I served on a special committee for St. Mary's University School of Law in the
mid-1990s. This was our only significant interaction.
1 See Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Sup. CT. TEX.,
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/court/justice-wjefferson.asp (last updated Sept. 13,
2011) (noting that Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson was appointed on September 14, 2004).
2 See MICHAEL ARIENS, LONE STAR LAW: A LEGAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 210 (2011) (noting
that since 1999 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has been made up of Republicans);
Justices of the Court: The Supreme Court of Texas, SUP. CT. TEX.,
http:/lwww.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/court/justices.asp (last updated June 13, 2011) (listing
the nine justices who make up the composition of the Texas Supreme Court); Texas Supreme
Court, Leadership Directory, REPUBLICAN PARTY TEX., http://www.texasgop.orgltexas-





Wallace Jefferson was born on July 22, 1963, in Tacoma,
Washington, the second youngest of six children.3 When he was
four his parents moved to San Antonio, where Jefferson was raised. 4
After graduating from high school, Jefferson attended and
graduated from Michigan State University with a degree in
philosophy.5 His older brother Lamont recommended he consider
attending the University of Texas School of Law.6 Jefferson took his
brother's advice, graduating from the University of Texas Law
School in 1988. 7 He practiced law in the San Antonio firm of Groce,
Locke & Hebdon, and with two other appellate lawyers, created the
firm of Crofts, Callaway & Jefferson, also in San Antonio.8 Among
his appellate cases were two appearances before the Supreme Court
of the United States.9 In March 2001, at just thirty-seven-years-old,
he was appointed associate justice of the Texas Supreme Court by
fellow Republican Governor Rick Perry.10 In late 2004, Perry
appointed him chief justice.11  As required by the Texas
Constitution, he ran in the next election to serve the remainder of
his predecessor's term.12 He was re-elected to a full six-year term as
chief justice in the November 2008 elections. 13 As is almost always
Supreme Court as members and leaders of the Republican Party).
3 Biography: Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, PROJECT VOTE SMART, [hereinafter
Biography], http://www.votesmart.org/candidate/biography/59079/wallace-jefferson (last
visited May 15, 2012) (stating that Chief Justice Jefferson was born on July 22, 1963); Kevin
Priestner, Profile, Wallace Jefferson, 66 TEX. B. J. 405, 406 (2003).
4 Priestner, supra note 3, at 406.
5 The Honorable Wallace B. Jefferson, Law School Foundation, U. TEX. SCH. L.,
http://www.utexas.edulaw/about/foundation/trustees/jefferson.html (last visited May 15,
2012); see Priestner, supra note 3, at 406.
6 See Priestner, supra note 3, at 406.
7 The Honorable Wallace B. Jefferson, Law School Foundation, supra note 5; see Priestner,
supra note 3, at 406-07.
8 Jefferson Named Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, 67 TEX. B.J. 732, 732 (2004);
Priestner, supra note 3, at 405.
9 Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1; Priestner, supra note 3, at 405.
10 Biography, supra note 3 (noting that Chief Justice Jefferson was born on July 22, 1963,
therefore making him thirty-seven as of March 2001); Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson,
supra note 1 (noting that Jefferson was appointed in March 2011 by Governor Perry);
Statewide Officials, REPUBLICAN PARTY TEX., http://www.texasgop.org/statewide-officials (last
visited May 15, 2012) (listing Governor Rick Perry as a member of the Republican Party).
1 Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1.
12 See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 28(a); Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1.
13 See Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1 (noting that his current term ends
December 21, 2014).
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stated in articles about Jefferson, he is the first African-American
justice (as well as chief justice) in the history of the Texas Supreme
Court. 14 He is currently the Texas Supreme Court's second-longest
serving member, to Justice Nathan Hecht's twenty-three-plus
years. 15
B. Texas Appellate Court System
Since Texas adopted its 1876 Constitution, the Texas Supreme
Court's jurisdiction has been limited to civil matters. 16 From that
year through 1891 all criminal matters were appealed to the Texas
Court of Appeals, 17 a court that became a national laughingstock for
its astounding rate of reversals of convictions 18 and its decision to
chastise the Supreme Court of the United States.1 9 The members of
the convention drafting the Texas Constitution separated appellate
jurisdiction to remedy a persistent problem in Texas legal history:
too few appellate judges (and courts) to hear and decide appeals in a
timely manner.20 This initial division of authority failed to solve the
problem. 21 An 1891 amendment created the Court of Criminal
Appeals, which possessed jurisdiction in all criminal cases, "with
such exceptions and under such regulations as may be provided in
14 See, e.g., Anita Davis, Wallace Jefferson Takes Oath of Office, 64 TEX. B. J. 580, 580
(2001) (noting that Jefferson was the first African-American judge on the Texas Supreme
Court); Jefferson Named Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 732. The
first African American to serve on one of Texas' two co-equal supreme courts, the Texas
Supreme Court, and the Court of Criminal Appeals was Morris Overstreet, who began his
service on the Court of Criminal Appeals in 1990. ARIENS, supra note 2, at 210. In 2002,
Dale Wainwright, also black, was elected to the Supreme Court of Texas. Justice Dale
Wainwright Biography, REELECTDALEWAINWRIGHT.COM, http://www.reelectdalewainwright
.com/biography (last visited May 15, 2012).
15 See Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1 (noting that Chief Justice Jefferson
was appointed to the court in 2001); Justices of the Court: The Supreme Court of Texas, supra
note 2 (showing the years each current justice of the court was appointed, including Justice
Hecht, appointed in 1988).
16 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
17 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6, amended by TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a).
is See ARIENS, supra note 2, at 55-56; Overruled Their Judicial Superiors, 21 AM. L. REV.
610, 610-11 (1887).
19 See Overruled Their Judicial Superiors, supra note 18, at 610 (explaining that the Texas
Court of Appeals overruled a Supreme Court decision, believing that it was not well-decided
and was an example of the Supreme Court usurping constitutional authority that it was
never intended to have).
20 Fifty-Eighth Day, Thursday, November 1, 1875, in DEBATES IN THE TEXAS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1875 421, 422 (Seth Shepard McKay ed., 1930); see ARIENS,
supra note 2, at 48.
21 ARIENS, supra note 2, at 48; see Overruled Their Judicial Superiors, supra note 18, at
610-11 (arguing that the creation of the Texas Court of Appeals should have resulted in more
affirmances of criminal appeals rather than reversals, and that there is "something strongly
defective" when the opposite result is occurring).
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this Constitution or as prescribed by law."22 The Texas Court of
Appeals was re-named the Texas Court of Civil Appeals and was
given jurisdiction to hear and decide initial appeals in civil matters,
thus partly sheltering the Texas Supreme Court from an avalanche
of appellate writs.23
C. Today's Texas Supreme Court
The Texas Supreme Court consists of nine Republicans. 24 Two of
its members are African-American, two are Hispanic, including one
of the court's two female members, and five are Anglo. 25 Once a
one-party state in which membership in the Republican Party
served as a disqualifying factor for those interested in serving in the
judiciary, 26 Texas is presently a one-party state dominated by
Republicans in state offices.27 Since 1850, with a notable exception
during Reconstruction, 28 all Texas judges are elected, and elected
22 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a).
23 Id. § 6. For the text of the amendment, see S.J. Res. 16, 22nd Leg. (Tex. 1891), available
at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/sessionLaws/22-0/SJR_16.pdf, at 198-99. The 1891
amendment also failed to meet the goal of clearing the court's docket. By 1915, the court was
five years behind its docket. Michael Ariens, The Storm Between the Quiet: Tumult in the
Texas Supreme Court, 1911-21, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 641, 688-89 (2007).
24 See Andrew Kreighbaum, One Open Supreme Court Seat, and Six Candidates, TEX.
TRIB.,.Feb. 26, 2010, http://www.texastribune.org/texas-courts/texas-supreme-courtone-open-
supreme-court-seat-and-six-candidates/.
25 See Justices of the Court: The Supreme Court of Texas, supra note 2 (providing profiles
and pictures of each of the justices of the court).
26 See Bancroft C. Henderson & T.C. Sinclair, The Selection of Judges in Texas, 5 HOUS. L.
REV. 430, 467 tbl.14, 468 tbl.15 (1967).
27 All Texas officials currently serving in statewide political and judicial positions are
Republicans. See Ross Ramsey, In Their Election Drought, Texas Democrats Find Solace in
the G.O.P.'s Past Struggles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/
politics/texas-democrats-find-solace-in-past-gop-struggles.html (noting that in Texas there
has not been a statewide elected Democrat since 1994); Statewide Officials, supra note 10
(listing the current Texas governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general, state comptroller,
land commissioner, agriculture commissioner, and railroad commissioners as members of the
Republican National Party); Texas Supreme Court, Leadership Directory, supra note 2 (listing
the nine justices of the Texas Supreme Court as members and leaders of the Republican
Party); Political Parties, The One-Party State of Texas?, TEX. POL.,
http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/4_4 2.html (discussing the rise of the Republican Party in
Texas). In a number of pockets in Texas, Democrats control many or all of the local,
countywide, and regional. political and judicial offices. See People, TEX. DEMOCRATIC PARTY,
http://www.txdemocrats.org/ (last visited May 15, 2012) (listing the elected democratic
officials in the Texas House of Representatives, Texas Senate, State Board of Education,
Court of Appeals, and District Courts); Ramsey, supra ("Some of the state's biggest counties-
Dallas, Harris, Travis and Bexar-already elect Democrats to county office, in some cases
after years of electing Republicans.").
28 HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JUDICIAL SELECTION:
OPTIONS FOR CHOOSING JUDGES IN TEXAS 1 (1997) [hereinafter TEX. HOUSE OF REPS.],
available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/focus/jud-sel.pdf.
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through party affiliation. 29
The last Democratic Party member on the Texas Supreme Court
was defeated in the November 1998 elections. 30 Thus, for over
thirteen years the Texas Supreme Court has consisted solely of
Republican Party members. 31 This uniformity of party affiliation
may mean something less than it appears. When Texas political
and judicial offices were controlled by members of the Democratic
Party, factions within the party made for highly contested primary
elections (most notable, of course, was the 1948 primary race for the
Democratic Party nomination for Senator between Lyndon Baines
Johnson and Coke Stevenson). 32  Factions within the current
Republican Party increase the number of contested primary races. 33
Although no current member of the Texas Supreme Court views his
or her commission in broad, sweeping terms, the limitations of party
affiliation are found in the number of dissents registered annually
in the court. 34
The Texas Supreme Court has disposed of between 109 and 164
causes each year since Jefferson has served as Chief Justice. 35
Similar to many earlier iterations of the court, it has had difficulty
clearing its docket.36 It was newsworthy that in fiscal year 2009,
the number of continuing causes was at a nearly-decade low of
sixty-two.37
29 ARIENS, supra note 2, at 202; Chris Klemme, Jacksonian Justice: The Evolution of the
Elective Judiciary in Texas, 1836-1850, 105 Sw. HIST. Q. 429, 430 (2002) (discussing the rise
of the popular election of the judiciary in Texas); TEX. HOUSE OF REPS., supra note 28, at 1
(explaining the rise of the popular election system for judges in Texas).
30 See ARIENS, supra note 2, at 209-10.
31 Kreighbaum, supra note 24.
32 See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MEANS OF ASCENT xxxi-ii,
265-67 (1990). See generally Dale Baum & James L. Hailey, Lyndon Johnson's Victory in the
1948 Texas Senate Race: A Reappraisal, 109 POL. Sci. Q. 595, 596 (1994) (analyzing the
victory of Lyndon B. Johnson for the U.S. Senate seat over Coke Stevenson in 1948 when
Texas was a "one-party state").
33 See R.A. Dyer, Republicans See More Contested Primary Races, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.redorbit.com/news/politics/394502/republicans-see_
morejcontesteCprimaryraces/ (discussing the competing factions in the Republican Party in
2006).
34 Texas Supreme Court Unofficial Statistics, DOCKETDB.COM, http://docketdb.com/stats
(last visited May 15, 2012) (listing eighteen dissenting opinions in 2006, eighteen in 2007,
twenty-nine in 2008, twenty-seven in 2009, twelve in 2010, and twenty-seven in 2011).
35 CARL REYNOLDS, OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY:
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 25 tbl. (2010).
36 See id. at 23, 25 (showing that the increases in cases added outnumber the amount
disposed); see also ARIENS, supra note 2, at 48 (discussing the "massive" number of cases
pending before the Texas Supreme Court in 1875 and subsequently in 1876, even after the
court was "stripped' of its ability to hear criminal appeals).
37 REYNOLDS, supra note 35, at 25.
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II. CHIEF JUSTICE JEFFERSON'S OPINIONS
Chief Justice Jefferson rarely speaks explicitly of his
jurisprudential views, requiring the inquisitive to construct his
interpretive manner and style through an evaluation of his implicit
assumptions. I will argue that the best evidence of those views is
found not in his opinions for the court, but in his dissenting and
concurring opinions. His opinions for the court, particularly when
the court is divided, reflect an overriding consideration of the body
for which he writes. In majority opinions, the Chief Justice effects
changes in Texas law incrementally and modestly. In contrast, his
concurring and dissenting opinions are free from the constraints of
representing others. Those relatively "free" opinions offer some
insight into Chief Justice Jefferson's structural understanding of
the role of the judiciary in a democratic society.
My assessment of his work is based on a review of sixty-seven of
his signed majority opinions, 38 twelve concurring opinions, 39 and
nineteen dissenting opinions 40 written as Chief Justice through
2011. In this essay, I concentrate on his opinions for the court when
it is substantially divided (in other words, with at least two dissents
or two concurrences that disagree substantially with the court's
reasoning).41
38 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined:
OPINIONBY(Jefferson) and JUDGES (Jefferson). The search results were only within the
specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004 to December 31, 2011. The members
of the court are also responsible for per curiam opinions. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201,
1251 (9th ed. 2009) (noting that per curiam opinions are decisions authored by an entire
appellate court as opposed to a single judge). The court does not reveal the name of the
technical author of per curiam opinions. Id. at 1201.
39 Search Terms in Lexis Nexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined Judge!
(JEFFERSON) and Dissent! (Jefferson); JUDGE! (Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson). The
search results were only within the specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004
to December 31, 2011.
40 Search Terms in Lexis Nexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined Judge!
(JEFFERSON) and Dissent! (Jefferson); JUDGE! (Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson). The
search results were only within the specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004
to December 31, 2011. He has also joined dissenting opinions, written by others in twenty-
seven cases through 2011. In several cases, the Chief Justice is concurring in part and
dissenting in part. I have used my judgment to categorize these opinions as either concurring
or dissenting opinions.
41 Chief Justice Jefferson wrote the unanimous opinion (one member did not participate) in
In re Commitment of Fisher. 164 S.W.3d 637, 639 (Tex. 2005). The court upheld Texas's Civil
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act against several constitutional challenges. Id.
at 639, 644-45, 656. It held that the statute was civil, not criminal, and therefore a mentally
incompetent person was not denied due process because the hearing occurred during his
incompetency. Id. at 653, 656. Fisher has been cited favorably by a number of courts in other
states. See, e.g., Moore v. Superior Court, 237 P.3d 530, 544 (Cal. 2010); In re Commitment of
Weekly, 956 N.E.2d 634, 651 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (agreeing with the Texas Supreme Court
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A. Introduction
The majority opinions written by Chief Justice Jefferson are
concentrated in the following subject areas: civil procedure,
governmental immunity, insurance law, real property (including
zoning and takings cases), and will/probate cases.42 He has also
written two majority opinions on the appropriate standards of
attorney conduct. 43 Approximately three-quarters of his majority
opinions are unanimous or joined by one concurring opinion. 44
The following three subsections address Chief Justice Jefferson's
opinions for the court, in concurrence, and in dissent.45 I reach the
following conclusions about his work: (1) his opinions reflect a wide
knowledge of the law. Most are studded with well-considered
references to secondary sources, including law review articles,
treatises, and various restatements of the law, as well as to relevant
case law from other jurisdictions; (2) he is particular about the
procedural framework through which the case has reached the
Texas Supreme Court. This fastidiousness is not indicative of a
legal formalism interested solely in the niceties of the law, but of a
reluctance to overreach. Any substantive legal conclusions are
reached only when the case is properly before the court. His
reluctance to overreach can lead to a categorical conclusion, a type
of neo-formalism, largely borne of a respect for the other branches of
state government. However, Chief Justice Jefferson's jurisprudence
may best be characterized as consonant with the legal process
school that flourished in the mid-twentieth century;46 (3) his
that the proceedings were civil in nature and thus no due process violation occurred).
42 See, e.g., Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 832,
834-35 (Tex. 2010) (governmental immunity and takings); Holmes v. Beatty, 290 S.W.3d 852,
853 (Tex. 2009) (will/probate law); In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2009) (civil procedure);
City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 771-72 (Tex. 2006) (zoning
law); Old Am. Cnty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 112-13 (Tex. 2004)
(insurance law).
43 In addition to Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006), discussed
infra Part II.B and infra text accompanying notes 49-111, the Chief Justice wrote the court's
opinion in Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc. 192 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex. 2006)
(holding that a personal representative of an estate may maintain a legal malpractice claim
on behalf of the estate against decedent's estate planners). Because Texas is one of just nine
states to hold that a beneficiary of a will or trust may not bring a malpractice claim against
the attorney who drafted the will or trust, the court's decision in Belt was significant. Id. at
783.
44 Search Terms in Lexis Nexis: Texas Federal and State Cases: JUDGE! (Jefferson) AND
OPINIONBY(Jefferson) (showing seventy-one total opinions authored by Chief Justice
Jefferson with forty-eight unanimous opinions and five opinions joined by one concurring
opinion). The search was limited to September 14, 2004-December 31, 2011.
45 See infra Part II.B-D.
46 For an intellectual history of legal process (also called reasoned elaboration), see NEIL
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opinions for a divided court indicate both a pragmatism and a
willingness to view the common law more broadly than his
dissenting colleagues; and (4) his concurring and dissenting
opinions are fully realized jurisprudential efforts, which prepare a
path on which a future court may travel.
B. Majority Opinions
The number of contested majority opinions written by Chief
Justice Jefferson were few in number in his first several years on
the court. From late 2004-2007, Chief Justice Jefferson wrote the
majority opinion in cases in which at least two justices dissented
just four times.47 Of these four cases, the court's decision in Hoover
Slovacek LLP v. Walton generated the most intense and challenging
dissent. 48
A six-person majority49 held a law firm's contingency fee contract
contrary to public policy because it included a provision that upon
discharge before termination of the matter, the law firm was
immediately due "a fee equal to the present value of the attorney's
interest in the client's claim."50  Because the payment-upon-
discharge provision was contrary to public policy, it was
unenforceable. 51 The law firm was hired by John B. Walton, Jr. to
recover unpaid royalties from companies extracting oil and gas from
Walton's 32,500-acre ranch. 2  Walton authorized the law firm to
settle the dispute for $8.5 million.53 The firm's initial settlement
demand in January 1997 was for $58.5 million. 54 Opposing counsel
testified that, after hearing that offer, he "quit listening."55  The
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99 (1995).
47 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined:
OPINIONBY(Jefferson) and JUDGE! (Jefferson). The search was limited to September 14,
2004-December 31, 2007. See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 559, 566; Kroger Tex. Ltd. P'ship v.
Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788, 791, 797 (Tex. 2006); In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of
McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 828, 832 (Tex. 2005); J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172
S.W.3d 609, 610, 616 (Tex. 2005).
48 See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 566-72 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (providing the dissent of
Justice Hecht, joined by Justices Medina and Willett); see infra text accompanying notes 79-
108.
49 See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 559 (majority opinion) (indicating that the court's opinion,
delivered by Chief Justice Jefferson, was also joined by Justice O'Neill, Justice Wainwright,
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next month, an offer of $6 million was made to Walton's attorney;
an offer that settled all of Walton's claims, but also purchased some
surface estates, acquired easements, and secured Walton's
royalties. 56 Walton authorized a settlement of the royalty dispute
for $6 million, but refused to sell any property.57 In March, Walton
discharged the law firm. 58 His subsequent lawyers settled for
$900,000. 59 Before that settlement, Hoover Slovacek sent Walton a
bill for $1.7 million (28.66%, the final contingent fee percentage,
multiplied by $6 million). 60 Walton refused to pay Hoover Slovacek,
and the latter's claim was severed from the $900,000 settlement
and subsequently tried before a jury.61  Walton claimed he
possessed good cause to fire Hoover Slovacek and that the firm's fee
was unconscionable. The jury did not find in favor of Walton on
either claim.62  It "awarded Hoover $900,000."63 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the "fee agreement was
unconscionable as a matter of law."64
The statement closest to a rhetorical flourish is, "[i]n Texas, we
hold attorneys to the highest standards of ethical conduct in their
dealings with their clients."65 The Chief Justice shortly thereafter
quoted Benjamin Cardozo's declaration that a fiduciary "is held to
something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior."66 The opinion for the court held that the
payment-upon-discharge provision violated Texas law on
compensation for discharged lawyers working on a contingent fee
basis in several ways: (1) the payment-upon-discharge provision
violated Texas case law because it imposed an "undue burden on the
client's ability to change counsel";67 (2) prior case law barred an
attorney receiving compensation pursuant to a contingent fee
agreement from receiving compensation in excess of the client's
56 Id.
57 Id.




62 Id. (footnote omitted).
63 Id.
64 Id. (citing Walton v. Hoover, Bax & Slovacek LLP, 149 S.W.3d 834, 837 (Ct. App. Tex.
2004), rev'd, 206 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. 2006)).
65 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 560.
66 Id. at 561 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.));
see also FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 410
(1993) (quoting Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 545).
67 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 563.
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"actual recovery";68 and (3) the payment-upon-discharge provision
violated Rule 1.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct because it granted the law firm "a proprietary interest in
the client's claim by entitling him to a percentage of the claim's
value without regard to the ultimate results obtained."69
Although Chief Justice Jefferson only occasionally uses law and
economics analysis, 70 in Walton he also evaluated the manner in
which the contract allocated risk, and thus incentives, between
lawyer and client. 71  The court noted that the benefits of the
payment-upon-discharge provision inured to the law firm, while the
client remained responsible for the accompanying risks. 72 The
contingent fee contract in Walton did not, like most such contracts,
"encouraged efficiency and diligent efforts [by the lawyer] to obtain
the best results possible."73 Instead, it created perverse incentives
for the lawyer to escape the contingency, which increases the
possibility of ancillary litigation between the client and the
discharged law firm over the contract.74 Finally, the contingent fee
agreement failed to state who determined the "present value of the
attorney's interest in the client's claim."75 The common law imposed
upon the attorney the duty to clarify the manner in which the fee
was to be calculated, and the law firm's failure to do so contributed
to the court's legal conclusion that the contract was
unconscionable. 76
The dissent written by Justice Nathan Hecht, and joined by
Justices David Medina and Don Willett, 77 argues the considerations
68 Id. (quoting Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex. 2001)).
69 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 564; see TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.04
(1984).
70 But see F.F.P. Operating Partners L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 694 (Tex. 2007)
(Jefferson, C.J., dissenting) (noting the "perverse incentive" created by a prior decision on the
Dram Shop Act and concluding the legislature could not have intended it to allow as a defense
to a civil liability claim made pursuant to the act "proof that the [bar] made a sale that the
dram shop statute quite sensibly forbids").
71 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 561.
72 Id. at 564.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 559, 565.
76 The court agreed with the Texas Court of Appeals that Hoover Slovacek failed to present
evidence of the reasonable value of its services, and thus held no quantum meruit claim
continued. Id. at 565-66. However, Texas law permitted Hoover Slovacek to recover on its
contract if it was discharged without good cause and the jury held Walton lacked good cause
to fire the firm. Id. at 566. But Walton's appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals claimed this
finding lacked legal and factual sufficiency, a claim the court ignored because it concluded the
entire fee was unreasonable. Id. at 565-66. The matter was thus reversed in part and
remanded to the court of appeals. Id. at 566.
77 Id. (Hecht, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 75.42160
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of the court are largely irrelevant or inconsequential. 78 Though not
couched in such terms, the dissent focuses on two factors about
which it and the court disagree: (1) Contracts between attorneys
and clients, or at least the contract between sophisticated clients
such as Walton and Hoover Slovacek, should be read as ordinary
contracts. 79  The court's citation to Cardozo's demand that the
fiduciary (attorney) act beyond the morals of the marketplace, with
a "punctilio of an honor," is unconvincing to the dissent;80 and (2)
Walton's sophistication should bar the court from concluding that
provision is unconscionable.8 ' The possibility that a similar
contract involving other types of parties was unconscionable was
insufficient to lead to the court's conclusion.
8 2
The dissent begins by stating that "[n]o rational plaintiff changes
lawyers midway through a case in order to recover less, and John B.
Walton, Jr. was not irrational."8 3 This statement allows the dissent
to argue that Walton rationally calculated at the time he retained
the law firm that, if he needed to discharge Hoover Slovacek, "it
would be to maximize recovery."8 4 The assumption that Walton was
a rational maximizer of his needs (a classic first-generation law and
economics assumption) leads to a second assumption: Walton was
rationally calculating his economic interests at the time he
contracted with Hoover Slovacek.8 5 Those two assumptions lead to
the conclusion that Walton was able to calculate rationally (and
compare) the monetary value of the payment-upon-discharge
provision with existing law providing discharged contingent fee
lawyers a claim for compensation if discharged without good
cause. 86 In Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, the Texas Supreme Court
held that a lawyer hired on a contingent fee contract and discharged
without good cause could recover a fee based on either quantum
meruit or on the contract itself.8 7 If the lawyer was discharged for
good cause, the lawyer was prohibited from suing to collect a fee
78 See id. at 568-70 (listing the dissent's summary of the seven reasons the majority gave
for its decision, which they view as irrelevant and uncertain examples of how the contract
could possibly be unconscionable under hypothetical circumstances other than the ones
present in this case).
79 See id. at 567-68.
80 See id. at 561, 567-68 (majority opinion) (Hecht, J., dissenting).
81 See id. at 566 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
12 See id. at 568, 570.
83 Id. at 566.
84 Id.
85 See id.
86 Id. at 566-69.
87 Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969).
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based on the contingent fee contract.88
What Mandell & Wright did not decide was whether a lawyer
hired on a contingent fee contract and discharged for good cause
could collect a fee based on quantum meruit.8 9 The dissent is well
aware of the uncertain status of the law.90  In noting the
possibilities available to Walton when he rationally considered the
value of the payment-upon-termination provision, the dissent stated
that if the law firm was discharged for good cause, "it might have
the right to be paid the value of its services."91 That statement was
followed by a reference to footnote one.92 Footnote one cited three
cases, two of which were irrelevant.93 The third cited case, Rocha v.
Ahmad, was a decision by the Texas Court of Appeals.94 It held a
lawyer hired on a contingent fee contract and discharged for good
cause could attempt to recover a fee under quantum meruit. 95 If
Rocha v. Ahmad states the law, then why did the dissent use the
language, "might have the right"?96 It used "might" because the
Texas Supreme Court has not decided a case similar to Rocha. And
since Rocha was decided in 1984, 97 the American Law Institute had
issued its Restatement (Third) of the Law: The Law Governing
Lawyers.98 In section 40(2) of the Restatement, titled Fees on
Termination, a lawyer may recover the proportion of compensation
due the lawyer provided by contract only if "the discharge or
withdrawal is not attributable to misconduct of the lawyer."99
Thus, a sophisticated client such as Walton would also have
known (or been charged with knowing) when the contingent fee
contract was made that the state of the law regarding fees due upon
termination for good cause was unclear. 100 It was possible that the
lawyer would receive nothing'0 1 or the full amount of a quantum
88 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 566-67 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
89 See Mandell & Wright, 441 S.W.3d at 843, 847.
90 See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 568 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 566.
92 Id. at 566-67 & n. 1.
93 Id. at 567 n.1 (citing Royden v. Ardoin, 331 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. 1960); Rocha v.
Ahmad, 676 S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. App. 1984); Kelly v. Murphy, 630 S.W.2d 759, 761-62 (Tex.
App. 1982)).
94 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 567 n.1 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (citing Rocha, 676 S.W.2d 149).
95 Rocha, 676 S.W.2d at 156 (citing Howell v. Kelly, 534 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976); Willis & Conner v. Turner, 25 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)).
9 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 566 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
97 Rocha, 676 S.W.2d at 149.
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000).
99 Id. § 40(2). Section 37 of the Restatement declares all or part of a lawyer's fee forfeited if
the lawyer engaged in "clear and serious violation of duty to a client." Id. § 37.
100 See Walton, 206 S.W.2d at 566-69 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
101 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 40(2) (2000).
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meruit claim.10 2 How this legal uncertainty might affect a rational
maximizer of his own interests seems impossible to say. The
dissent concludes that a client and law firm may agree to a
termination provision "that avoids wrangling over whether
discharge was with or without cause, given the intrinsic
uncertainties in that issue."10 3 This conclusion is true enough, but
insufficient. It masks both the disparity in legal knowledge
between lawyers and the most sophisticated client, and the
disparity in intensity of desire. Although a sophisticated client may
possess the knowledge that discharge for good cause creates the
possibility of a different measure of damages than a discharge
without good cause, even the court is uncertain ("might") whether
an attorney discharged for cause may recover on quantum meruit.10 4
The dissent twice characterizes the contract as "fair"'105 and once
as "rather innocuous,"'0 6 on each occasion with little elaboration.
These conclusions appear premised on the dissent's disagreement
with the court about the role the courts should play in evaluating
attorney-client contracts. 107
What Hoover Slovacek LLP v. Walton signals is an apparent shift
in Texas law on attorney fees. 08 Mandell & Wright is unusual
among the states because it allows a discharged lawyer in a
contingent fee matter to recover on either quantum meruit or on the
contingent fee contract itself.10 9 The majority rule limits a lawyer's
recovery to quantum meruit. 110 Chief Justice Jefferson's opinion for
the court' retains a traditional understanding of the ethical duties a
lawyer owes her clients."'
A recent decision written by Chief Justice Jefferson that suggests
102 See Rocha, 676 S.W.2d at 156 (citing Howell v. Kelly, 534 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976); Willis & Conner v. Turner, 25 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)).
103 Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 568 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
104 See id. at 566.
105 Id. at 567, 568.
106 See id. at 567.
107 See id. at 568, 570.
108 See Tiffanie S. Clausewitz, Recent Development, On the Trail to Increased Client
Protection: Attorney Contingent Fee Contract Termination in Light of Hoover v. Walton, 39 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 539, 541, 571 (2008).
1W Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969) (internal citations
omitted); see, e.g., Auguston ex rel. Auguston v. Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile S.A., 76 F.3d 658,
662-63 n.6 (5th Cir. 1996).
010 See Rocha v. Ahmad, 676 S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. App. 1984) (citing Howell v. Kelly, 534
S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Willis & Conner v. Turner, 25 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930)); see also Auguston, 76 F.3d at 663 n.6 (stating that the majority of
jurisdictions limit the lawyer's "recovery to quantum meruit").
111 See Walton, 206 S.W.3d at 560-61 (quoting Lopez v. Mufioz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P.,
22 S.W.3d 857, 866-68 (Tex. 2000)).
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a significant shift in Texas law is Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v.
City of Alton.112 Sharyland Water Supply Corporation is a non-
profit corporation that supplies water to the residents of Alton and
elsewhere. 113 In a water supply agreement with the city of Alton,
Sharyland agreed to supply potable water to the city's residents,
and in exchange was given title to the existing Alton water
system. 114 In the 1990s, Alton hired several companies to build a
sewer system. 115 According to Sharyland, part of the sewer system
was negligently constructed, causing harm to Sharyland. 116 This
negligence, Sharyland claimed, breached its agreement with the city
of Alton, and it won a verdict of over one million dollars. 1" 7 The
court of appeals held that Sharyland's negligence claim was barred
by the economic loss rule.118 This rule, in general, states that a
party that suffers only a pecuniary loss due to negligence by
another may not recover in some tort law claims. 119
In a careful review of Texas precedents, Chief Justice Jefferson
noted that the economic loss rule had been applied "only in cases
involving defective products or failure to perform a contract." 120 It
had never applied the rule more broadly as prohibiting the recovery
of economic damages in a tort claim.1 2' Chief Justice Jefferson then
took an approach he has regularly applied in his opinions: he
avoided deciding issues that the court did not need to decide. The
extent to which the economic loss rule applied was irrelevant to
resolving the case "because the court of appeals [had] erred in
concluding that Sharyland's water system [in Alton] had not been
damaged."' 22  Because the water system had once conformed to
state law and now did not, Sharyland was required by its agreement
with Alton to remedy this compliance failure.1 23  That meant
112 Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407, 409 (Tex. 2011).
113 Id. at 410.
114 Id.
115 Id. (citing City of Alton v. Sharyland Water Supply Corp., 277 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex.
App. 2009)).
116 Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 410 (citing City of Alton, 277 S.W.3d at 140).
117 Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 411.
118 Id. (citing City of Alton, 277 S.W.3d at 155).
119 See generally Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss
Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 525-26 (2009) (stating that one cannot recover economic
losses in a negligence suit without a showing of personal or property damage). As the court
notes, several economic loss rules exist, not just one. See Sharyland, 354 SW.3d at 415
(quoting Johnson, supra, at 534-35).
120 Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 418.
121 See id.
122 Id. at 420 (citing City of Alton, 277 S.W.3d at 154).
123 Sharyland, 354 S.W.3d at 420.
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expending significant funds, for which the jury awarded damages. 124
Since 2008, Chief Justice Jefferson has written several majority
opinions for the court from which two or more justices either
dissented or merely concurred with the majority opinion, including
three 2011 opinions in which the court split five-four. 25 These
cases often raise issues of first impression and, more importantly,
raise issues of the court's role in interpreting statutes, regulations,
and the path of the common law. Many of these cases contain
substantial procedural components, while others require close
statutory and constitutional interpretation.
In In re Brookshire Grocery Co.,1 26 Badiga v. Lopez, 127 In re
E.A., 128 University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas
v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia,129 and Texas A & M
University-Kingsville v. Yarbrough,130 Chief Justice Jefferson writes
an opinion for the court concerning aspects of the law of civil
procedure and practice, both court-generated rules of civil procedure
and statutes regulating the civil process. 131 In each case at least
two justices dissented from or merely concurred with the court's
holding. 132 Chief Justice Jefferson's opinions are written in a clear,
concise, and uncluttered fashion, and exemplify his approach to the
structural role of the courts.
124 Id.
125 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined:
OPINIONBY(Jefferson) and JUDGE! (Jefferson). The search was limited to January 1, 2008-
December 31, 2011. See, e.g., Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289,
289, 292 (Tex. 2011) (dividing the justices in a five-four vote); Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cox
Tex. Newspapers L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 113, 121 (Tex. 2011) (splitting the justices in a five-
four vote); City of Dall. v. Stewart, No. 09-0257, 2011 WL 2586882, at *1, *13 (Tex. July 1,
2011), withdrawn, 361 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. 2012) (splitting the justices in a five-four vote); City
of Dall. v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 233, 240 (Tex. 2011); Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts
v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336, 337, 349 (Tex. 2010); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at
Dall. v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544, 546, 552 (Tex. 2010);
In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 2, 6 (Tex. 2009); Badiga v. Lopez, 274 S.W.3d 681, 682, 685 (Tex.
2009); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Samsung Electronics Am., 268 S.W.3d 506, 507-08 (Tex. 2008); Zurich
Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 488, 501-02 (Tex. 2008); In re Brookshire Grocery
Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 73 (Tex. 2008).
126 In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 66.
127 Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 681.
128 In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 1.
129 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 544.
130 Tex. A & M Univ. -Kingsville, 347 S.W.3d at 289.
131 Id. at 290; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 547-52 (discussing a
party's right to interlocutory appeal and the notice requirements when a potential claim
against the government is to be filed); In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 2; Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 682;
In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 67.
132 Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville, 347 S.W.3d at 289, 292; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at
Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 546, 552; In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 2, 6; Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 682, 685;
In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 66, 73.
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Brookshire Grocery concerned whether the plenary power of the
trial court had already expired when it granted the defendant's
motion for a new trial.13 3 Brookshire Grocery was a defendant in a
tort action. 134 The jury issued a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.135
Before the trial court issued its judgment, the Grocery moved for
"Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and in the Alternative
Motion for New Trial."'136 The trial court issued judgment for the
plaintiff and a day later signed an order denying both the motion for
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the motion for a new
trial.137  "On January 7, 2005, twenty-nine days after [the]
judgment" was signed, Brookshire Grocery filed a motion for a new
trial.138 This motion was granted by the trial court on February
1.1 39 The issue was whether Brookshire's January 7 motion for a
new trial was filed in a timely manner as required by Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 329b(e). 140 If the motion was not filed in a timely
manner, the court's plenary power to grant a new trial had
expired.141 Chief Justice Jefferson's opinion for the court held the
January 7 motion was not timely filed.142 It noted that Rule 329b(b)
allowed an amended motion for a new trial if (1) "no preceding
motion for a new trial had been overruled," and (2) the motion was
filed thirty days before judgment. 143  Chief Justice Jefferson's
opinion additionally noted .'[a]nd' is conjunctive."'' 44 Because the
trial court had denied a prior motion for a new trial, Brookshire
could meet only the second element of the test of the Rule.145
In reaching its conclusion, the court looked at the history of the
Rule, particularly the reason for its amendment in 1981, and noted
several options available to counsel even after a motion for a new
trial had been denied. 46 The court's opinion also responded to the
dissent's claim that the motion should have been understood as a
motion to modify the judgment. 147 The court noted the caption of
133 In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 67.






140 Id. at 69; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
141 In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 69.
142 Id. at 72.
143 Id. at 69.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 72.
146 See id. at 70-72.
147 Id. at 72-73.
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the motion and the relief requested both asked for a new trial.148
Finally, the court explained that conflating a motion for a new trial
with a motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment, did violence
to the structure and text of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 149 Not only
did Rule 329b treat a motion for a new trial differently than a
motion to modify, correct, or reform a judgment, Rule 5's limitations
on the length of time trial courts possessed to take action were
evaded if the dissent's approach were adopted. 150 This was not, as
claimed by the dissent, merely one of those "meaningless
technicalities" of civil procedure that invoked a mindless
formalism. 151
In an underlying medical malpractice action, the issue before the
court was an interpretation of a provision of the Civil Practices and
Remedies Code concerning when a medical provider may prosecute
an interlocutory appeal. 152 As part of its alteration of the rules of
medical malpractice actions, the Texas legislature required a
medical malpractice plaintiff to submit an expert report to the
defendant within 120 days after suit is filed.153 The trial court
"must grant" a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff failed to file a
report. 54 If a report is filed in a timely fashion but is deficient, the
trial court may grant one thirty-day extension. 55 In the former
case, the failure by the trial court to grant the motion to dismiss
could be appealed immediately, but a decision to grant a thirty-day
extension was not subject to an interlocutory appeal. 56 In Badiga
v. Lopez, the plaintiff failed to timely serve defendant an expert
report. 57 The defendant moved to dismiss. 15  The district court
denied the motion to dismiss and at the same time granted plaintiff
a thirty-day extension to file the expert report. 15 9 The defendant
then filed an interlocutory appeal. 160 The court held that, when no
expert report had been made, the decisions to deny the motion to
dismiss and to grant the extension were separable, and thus the
148 Id.
149 See id. at 73.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 78 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
152 Badiga v. Lopez, 274 S.W.3d 681, 682-83 (Tex. 2009); see TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 74.351(b) (West 2012).
153 Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 683.
154 Id. at 682.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 682-83.





appellate court possessed jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal
of the order denying the motion to dismiss. 161
A year earlier, the court had held a decision of the trial court to
deny a motion to dismiss and grant a thirty-day extension to cure a
deficient, but timely, expert report unappealable. The dissent,
noting this decision,1 62 argued that the statute's plain reading
applied to all orders granting extensions of time. 163 The court's
response was to look at the purpose of the statute. 164 The reason for
a ban on interlocutory appeals of a denial of a motion to dismiss
when a thirty-day extension is granted to cure a deficient report is
judicial efficiency. 165 The only reason to ban appeals when no
expert report is served is to give the plaintiff additional time,
unreviewable by an appellate court, which harms the interests of
defendants. 166
Chief Justice Jefferson's opinion for the court in In re E.A. also
addressed an amended civil procedure provision. 167 Emilio, the
father of two minor children, petitioned the district court to modify
the order granting the mother, Norma, the exclusive right to
determine the children's primary residence. 168 The parties agreed
that Norma had received notice of this petition.169 Emilio later filed
an amended petition demanding more relief.170 The amended
petition lacked a certificate of service, but Emilio claimed he sent
Norma the petition via certified mail, as permitted by amended
Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 171 After three
attempts, the post office was unable to deliver the certified
petition. 172 After Emilio was granted a default judgment, "Norma
moved to set aside the default judgment" and requested other
relief.' 73 "The trial court denied [the] motions" and "[t]he court of
appeals affirmed." 174 The supreme court held the father failed to
161 Id. at 685.
162 Id. at 686 (Brister, J., dissenting) (citing Ogletree v. Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 321
(Tex. 2007)).
163 See Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 686.
16 See id. at 684.
165 See id.
166 See id. ("The purpose of the ban on interlocutory appeals for extensions is to allow
plaintiffs the opportunity to cure defects in existing reports.").
167 In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2009); see TEX. R. CIv. P. 21a.
166 In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 2.
169 Id. at 3.
170 Id. at 2-3.
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serve notice in compliance with Rule 21a and concluded the record
was insufficient to find constructive notice existed. 175 In reaching
this conclusion, the court decided that notice in compliance with
Rule 21a would be sufficient, altering Texas case law that required
an additional citation upon filing an amended petition for more
onerous relief.176
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas v.
Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia, the issue was
whether the defendant medical center, a governmental entity, was
given timely notice of a medical malpractice claim.177 This required
the court to determine whether a 2005 statute, amending the
Government Code to make all prerequisites to suit jurisdictional,
applied to the case, which arose before the amendment. 178 If the
amendment applied, the court next had to determine whether the
defendant received actual notice of the claim.' 79 The court carefully
assessed the reasons to apply the statute retroactively, and held it
should be so applied. 80 It then held that the defendant medical
center had received actual notice of the claim as required under the
Texas Tort Claims Act.' 8 ' The Chief Justice's opinion noted that the
Government Code did not require formal notice under the Tort
Claims Act if it received "actual notice that death has occurred."'8 2
Looking pragmatically at the evidence, the majority held the
defendant "was subjectively aware of its fault."'8 3 The court noted
the dissent's more stringent interpretation of actual notice would
require "an unqualified confession of fault," a standard that would
conflate an admission of liability with a claim of liability made by a
plaintiff.8 4 The court further noted that requiring formal notice to
protect governmental entities from unfounded claims would add
nothing to the actual notice already possessed by the defendant. 8 5
The most recent contested procedural opinion written by Chief
175 Id. at 5-6.
176 Id. at 6 ("Service of new citation is no longer required.").
177 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall. v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-Arancibia,
324 S.W.3d 544, 546 (Tex. 2010) (granting petition for review to determine if the plaintiffs
provided timely notice to the hospital regarding their medical malpractice claim).
178 Id. at 546-47; see TEX. Gov. CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2012).
179 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall., 324 S.W.3d at 547.
180 See id. at 547-48 (relying on the fact that retroactive application of a jurisdictional rule
impacts a court's right to hear a case and not substantive rights).
181 Id. at 548-50 (reasoning that a subjective awareness of fault constitutes actual notice
in this case); see TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(c) (West 2012).
182 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dali., 324 S.W.3d at 548 (quoting § 101.101(c)).
183 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dali., 324 S.W.3d at 549.




Justice Jefferson is Texas A & M University-Kingsville v.
Yarbrough.8 6 The issue was whether Yarbrough's legal claim, that
a dismissal by the university of her grievance violated her rights
under the Government Code, was moot.187 Yarbrough, then an
untenured professor, filed a grievance contesting a negative
performance evaluation, an evaluation that would be used in part to
determine whether she would be awarded tenure. 88 Yarbrough was
subsequently awarded tenure. 8 9 She continued to press her claim
on the ground that the failure by the university to change its
grievance policies was a continuing violation of her right to present
grievances. 90 The court held the controversy moot, finding no
exceptions to the doctrine allowing her case to survive.191 The court
rejected the dissent's claim that, because the negative performance
evaluation remained in her employment file, Yarbrough continued
to suffer collateral legal consequences. 192 The dissent's conclusion
exempted the suit from the mootness doctrine. 93 The possibility of
"unspecified future harm" was insufficient to mean a "substantial
controversy" existed. 194
Ockham's Razor is a famous "principle of parsimony" in the
history of philosophy. 195 Chief Justice Jefferson, who majored in
philosophy, 196 is both undoubtedly aware of Ockham's Razor and an
apparent believer in its application in law. Ockham's Razor
suggests that persons should prefer a simpler explanation to a more
complicated explanation. 197  His procedural opinions exemplify
Ockham's Razor: cutting to the heart of the issue, avoiding needless
digressions into matters not before the court, and interpreting
186 Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 289 (Tex. 2011).
187 See id. at 289-90 (concluding that there was no live controversy because the professor
was granted tenure before filing suit); see also TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 617.005 (West 2012)
(concluding that a collective bargaining chapter in the Government Code "does not impair"
the privilege of public workers to file grievances).
188 Tex. A & M Univ. -Kingsville, 347 S.W.3d at 289-90.
189 Id. at 290.
190 Id.
191 See id. at 290-91 (holding that no exception to the mootness doctrine existed because
the court found no evidence that Yarbrough would be precluded from seeking review of the
policy in the future and no showing that the duration of the policy is not so short as to
preclude review before the issue becomes moot, nor did the court find evidence that
Yarbrough would again receive negative evaluations).
192 Id. at 291.
193 See id.
194 Id. (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
195 ROBERT C. SOLOMON & KATHLEEN M. HIGGINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 149
(1996).
196 Priestner, supra note 4, at 406.
197 SOLOMON & HIGGINS, supra note 195, at 149.
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statutes and rules both plainly and purposively. In addition, the
Chief Justice's procedural opinions avoid party or issue bias. The
substantive issue in three of these five procedural cases is a tort
claim,198 and the Texas Supreme Court has been attacked as biased
in favor of tort defendants. 199  These opinions are studiously
indifferent to the underlying substantive claim, a measure of the
Chief Justice's concern with effectuating the reasons for procedural
rules. His opinions avoid both the fetish of legal formalism and the
flabbiness of some forms of legal realism.
Two additional sets of majority opinions written by Chief Justice
Jefferson also deserve some attention. In 2011, the court decided
two takings decisions, 200 and two opinions balancing claims of
individual privacy with disclosure of information of some public
import. 20'
In City of Dallas v. Stewart,20 2 following approximately seven
months after the decision in City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 203 a divided
court considered the processes by which the propriety of
constitutional takings claims were adjudged. 20 4 In Stewart, the
court held that using an administrative board to make "essentially
conclusive" judgments about a takings claim failed to properly
balance a person's constitutional right to property with the city's
interest in abating a nuisance. 20 5 In VSC, LLC, a divided court held
a company's decision to sue rather than use a statutory remedy to
petition for the return of their claimed property left the trial court
198 See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall. v. Estate of Arancibia ex rel. Vasquez-
Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544, 546, 550 (Tex. 2010) (medical malpractice tort claim); Badiga v.
Lopez, 274 S.W.3d 681, 682 (Tex. 2009) (medical malpractice tort claim); In re Brookshire
Grocery Co., 250 S.W,3d 66, 68 (Tex. 2008) (tort action).
199 See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1, 4-42
(2007) (attributing tort defendant victories to judges holding that there is no evidence to
support a plaintiffs verdict, judges adopting procedural rules that benefit defendants, and
judges interpreting statutes in favor of defendants); Caleb Rackley, A Survey of Sea-Change
on the Supreme Court of Texas and Its Turbulent Toll on Texas Tort Law, 48 S. TEx. L. REV.
733, 735 (2007) (noting that until the 1970s tort law in Texas was skewed to the defendants).
200 City of Dall. v. Stewart, No. 09-0257, 2011 WL 2586882, at *2-4 (Tex. July 1, 2011),
withdrawn, 361 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2012) (real property takings decision); City of Dall. v. VSC,
LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 233-34 (Tex. 2011) (motor vehicle takings decision).
201 See Tex. Dep't. of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 113 (Tex.
2011) (concerning the disclosure of a governor's travel expense vouchers); Tex. Comptroller of
Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336, 337-38 (Tex. 2010) (regarding the
privacy rights implicated in the disclosure of a state employee's date of birth).
202 The court denied a motion for rehearing and substituted its July opinion for an opinion
released on January 27, 2012. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 562.
203 See id. at 563 (deciding the case on January 27, 2012); VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d at 231
(deciding the case on July 1, 2011).




without jurisdiction to hear the claim. 20 6
Heather Stewart bought a house in the city of Dallas, and
abandoned it in 1991.207 In 2002, the city demolished the house. 20 8
In the interim, Dallas Code Enforcement personnel regularly visited
the house. 20 9  After a hearing before the Dallas Urban
Rehabilitation Standards Board, the board found the house was an
"urban nuisance." 210 It denied Stewart's request for a rehearing,
reaffirming its initial order.211 Approximately one month later,
after a Dallas inspector found Stewart's property had not been
repaired, the city obtained a demolition warrant from a judge, and
the house was demolished shortly thereafter. 212
Stewart appealed the decision of the Board to a district court, but
that "appeal did not stay the demolition order."213 After demolition,
she claimed the city had unconstitutionally taken her property. 214
The district court ordered a jury trial on the takings claim, and the
jury found that Stewart's house was not a public nuisance and
awarded her over $75,000.215 The City appealed, claiming the
board's decision that the house was a nuisance precluded any
contrary finding by a jury.216
The court, noting that "[t]akings suits are thus, fundamentally,
constitutional suits and must ultimately be decided by a court
rather than an agency," held "that this "matter of constitutional
right may [not] finally rest with a panel of citizens untrained in
constitutional law. 217
In City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, issued on July 1, 2011,218 the court
dismissed a constitutional takings claim by VSC, which sued
claiming the City had taken motor vehicles in which VSC possessed
an ownership interest.219 According to VSC, the City of Dallas
"seized 326 vehicles . . . from VSC, a licensed vehicle storage
facility."220  Police officers testified that all of the confiscated
206 VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d at 233.









216 Id. at 565.
217 Id. at 565, 567.
218 City of Dall. v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 231 (Tex. 2011).
219 Id. at 233.
220 Id. at 233-34.
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vehicles were either stolen or displayed some indicia that they had
been stolen.221 For forty-seven of the vehicles, VSC pursued its
statutory remedy in municipal court.222 For the other vehicles,
instead of pursuing its statutory remedy, VSC sued, claiming an
unconstitutional taking.223  Stewart had held the Texas
Constitution's Takings Clause self-executing. 224 Why was VSC
barred from asserting its constitutional claim rather than the
statutory remedy available to it?225 The court first noted "[t]he
[1]egislature's broad authority to prescribe ... remedies for takings"
claims, an authority subject only to constitutional requirements
such as due process.226 VSC claimed that the statutory remedy did
not provide it with due process because the city is not required to
notify claimants of those proceedings. 227 Relying on a 1999 decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, the court held that VSC
possessed actual notice of the seizure of the vehicles, notice that was
constitutionally sufficient because that remedial procedure was
"easily discoverable. 228
The same five justices who formed the majority in the five-to-four
decision in Stewart229 were joined by Justice Paul Green. 230 A
lengthy and thorough dissent by Justice Dale Wainwright argued in
part that the government failed to provide notice to VSC of its
disposal of the vehicles, which violated VSC's rights.231
The Texas Supreme Court has also recently issued two important
opinions balancing a person's right to privacy with the public's
interest in information about public employees, both written by
Chief Justice Jefferson. 232 In Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
221 Id. at 234.
222 Id. at 235.
223 Id.
224 City of Dall. v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex. 2012) (citing Steele v. City of Hous.,
603 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1980)); see TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
225 See City of Dall. v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. 2011) (precluding the
constitutional claim).
226 Id. at 236.
227 Id. at 238.
228 Id. at 238-39 (citing City of W. Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999)).
229 Stewart, 361 S.W.3d at 563 (noting that the majority consisted of Chief Justice
Jefferson and Justices Hecht, Medina, Willett, and Lehrmann).
230 VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d at 233 (adding Justices to the same Justices that formed the
majority in Stewart, which were Chief Justice Jefferson and Justices Hecht, Medina, Willett,
and Lehrmann).
231 Id. at 255 (Wainwright, J., dissenting).
232 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (West 2004). The court also interpreted the Texas
Public Information Act in City of Dallas v. Abbott, 304 S.W.3d 380, 381 (Tex. 2010). In that
6-2 decision, written by Justice O'Neill and joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, the court
evaluated the timeliness of a governmental entity's request for an opinion from the attorney
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v. Attorney General of Texas233 and Texas Department of Public
Safety v. Cox Texas Newspapers, L.P.,234 the court interpreted the
state's Public Information Act in ways that are less persuasive than
the approach taken by the dissents. 235
In both cases, media companies made a request for government
information. 236  Under Texas's Public Information Act, a
presumption favors disclosure of the requested information.237 In
both cases the Texas Supreme Court held that the requested
information (or at least some of the requested information) did not
have to be disclosed. 238 Both opinions are defensible but ultimately
unpersuasive.
In Texas Comptroller, the Dallas Morning News sought a copy of
the Texas Comptroller's payroll database.23 9  The Comptroller
provided all the information found in the database other than the
dates of birth of the employees. 240  It withheld date of birth
information based on section 552.101 of the Texas Government
Code, which exempted from disclosure "information considered to be
confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial
decision."241 Under section 552.102 of the Government Code,
"information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" is
also exempted from disclosure. 242 The Comptroller then requested
an opinion from the Attorney General asking whether she was
general. Id. It held that "timeliness ... is measured from the date a party seeking public
information responds to a governmental body's good-faith request for clarification or
narrowing of an unclear or overbroad information request." Id. Justice Wainwright also
dissented in Abbott, concluding that, because the Public Information Act stated that a
governmental entity had ten days to request an opinion from the attorney general once the
request was "received," a conclusion that the ten-day window did not begin until the request
was "clarified" was contrary to the Act. Id. at 388 (Wainwright, J., dissenting); see TEX. GOVT
CODE ANN. § 552.301 (West 2012).
233 Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Att'y Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010)
(reh'g denied, Jan. 14, 2011).
234 Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 2011).
235 Id. at 113-14 (interpreting the state's Public Information Act to determine whether it
requires the production of travel vouchers for Governor Rick Perry's security detail even if it
would put the governor in danger); Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 337-38 (deciding whether
the Public Information Act requires disclosure of the birth dates of the state employees to the
Dallas Morning News or whether this infringes on the employees' privacy rights).
236 Cox Tex. Newspapers, 343 S.W.3d at 113 (requesting production of travel vouchers for
Governor Rick Perry's security detail); Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 337 (showing that the
Dallas Morning News requested the birth dates of all state employees).
237 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.001(b) (West 2004).
238 Cox Tex. Newspapers, 343 S.W.3d at 120; Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 338.
239 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 337.
240 Id.
241 Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.101 (West 2011)).
242 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.101.
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required to disclose the dates of birth of state employees. 243 The
Attorney General concluded Texas law prohibited the Comptroller
from withholding information about employees' dates of birth.2 44
The Comptroller was then in the unusual position of suing the
Attorney General, while being represented by the Attorney
General. 245  The Morning News intervened. 246  The district court
and the court of appeals both held in favor of disclosure. 24
7
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, the Comptroller
reiterated her initial position that section 552.101 exempted birth
dates from disclosure. 248 As was made clear by the dissent, the
Comptroller expressly disclaimed any reliance on section 552.102.249
Even so, the court, twice claiming the existence of "unique
circumstances," held the Comptroller properly withheld date of
birth information under section 552.102.250
Chief Justice Jefferson's argument is sophisticated but ultimately
unpersuasive. He first noted that the state's employees possess a
common law privacy interest as third parties, an interest that must
be acknowledged by the court.251 Though the Comptroller did not
justify her actions under the personnel file exemption of section
552.102, the interests of those third parties plus the unique
circumstances of the case led the Texas Supreme Court to expand
the Comptroller's petition to include a section 552.102 argument. 252
Section 552.102 stated personnel information that "would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" was
exempt from disclosure. 253 This particular language, the court
noted, was identical to language in the federal government's
Freedom of Information Act's ("FOIA") exemption 6.254 That FOIA
exemption was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Department of
the Air Force v. Rose as creating a balancing test weighing an
243 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 337 (Tex. 2010) (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §
552.301).
244 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 338.
245 Id. at 338-39.
246 Id. at 339.
247 Id. at 338.
248 Id. at 351 (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing TEX. GOVT
CODE ANN. § 552.101).
249 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 350-51 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 552.101-02).
250 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 338, 340 (majority opinion).
251 Id. at 339-41 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.102) (holding that TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 552.102 extends privacy protection to state employees as third parties).
252 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 339-41.
253 Id. at 338 (quoting TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.102).
254 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 340-42 (citing Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(6) (West 2012); TEx. GOVT CODE ANN. § 552.102).
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individual's right of privacy with the public's interest in information
about the workings of the government. 255 The court then held that,
though a "balancing test is not required under section 552.101,"
because the Texas Public Information Act was "modeled" on the
FOIA, it would adopt federal precedent and use the Rose balancing
test to interpret section 552.102.256
In weighing this balance, the court found the privacy interests of
the employees "significant" while concluding the public interest in
employees' birth dates was "minimal."257 The disclosure of birth
dates enhanced the possibility of identity theft, which the court
declared, "is becoming one of the fastest growing criminal and
consumer offenses in the twenty-first century."258 Similarly, if birth
dates were disclosed, they would be disclosed, like the other
information given to the Dallas Morning News, in a searchable
form, increasing the possibility of identity theft. 259 The court then
made a logical leap: because the legislature statutorily exempted
from disclosure employees' social security numbers, home
addresses, and personal family information, the failure of the court
to exempt birth dates would render "meaningless" those statutory
exemptions "because those dates, when combined with name and
place of birth, can reveal social security numbers." 260  The court
then cited to a story in the very same Dallas Morning News on the
insecurity of social security numbers. 261 Thus, the privacy interests
of the employees were substantial. 262
In contrast, the court concluded that the disclosure of birth dates
"reveal[ed] little or nothing about an agency's own conduct." 263 It
then stated that once a substantial privacy interest existed, the
party requesting information was required to identify "a sufficient
reason for disclosure" of the information. 264 That reason, to use
birth dates to learn whether governmental agencies employed sex
255 Dep't Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380-81 (1976).
256 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 341-42.
257 Id. at 343, 347-58.
258 Id. at 343 (citing 2006 Tex. Op. Att'y Gen. 01938, at 3).
259 See Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 343-44, 347 (quoting Goyer v. N.Y State Dep't of
Env'tl. Conservation, 813 N.Y.S.2d 628, 639 (Sup. Ct. 2005)).
260 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 345.
261 Id. (citing Bob Moos, How Secure is Your Social Security Data?: Researchers' Claim
About System's Vulnerability Underscores Worries That Identify Theft Threat Will Rise, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9, 2009, at 1D, available at 2009 WLNR 15470333).
262 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 345.
263 Id. at 346 (quoting U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 750 (1989)).
26 Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 346-47 (citing Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v.
Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004)).
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offenders or convicted persons, was insufficient to overcome the
substantial privacy interests of all state employees. 265  It was
insufficient because "mere allegations of the possibility of
wrongdoing are not enough." 266 This standard, of course, could be
flipped (and was by the dissent).2 67 The privacy interest of state
employees was largely based on the possibility of identity theft, a
possibility the court failed to quantify, other than to note that an
estimate by the Federal Trade Commission of 27.3 million cases of
identity theft.26 8
The dissent by Justice Wainwright in Texas Comptroller focused
on a structural disagreement with the court. 269  Justice
Wainwright's conclusion was that the legislature had made its
intentions on date of birth information clear, making the court's
statutory interpretation invalid.270 First, the legislature had chosen
not to exempt birth dates from public disclosure. 271 Second, the
reason for the request for birth dates was based on a legitimate use
(to search for criminal convictions, and in part to distinguish among
the subsets of the 2,000 state employees who shared the same
name). 272 Third, the Texas legislature had: (a) passed the Identity
Theft Enforcement and Protection Act to protect all Texans from
identity theft; (b) chosen not to exempt birth dates from disclosure
in the Public Information Act; and (c) continued to sell birth date
information of Texas state employees (and others) to businesses
without generating any problems with identity theft.273
The dissent also argued the court erred in ignoring its precedents
on waiver to decide the case based on section 552.102, when the
Comptroller disclaimed that basis for adjudication. 274 It then
assessed the balancing test undertaken by the court.2 75 Any privacy
interest of state employees was limited to the information, not the
derivative use of that information (combining date of birth
261 See Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 346-48.
266 Id. at 346.
267 Id. at 357-58 (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
268 Id. at 343 (majority opinion) (citing 2006 Tex. Op. Att'y Gen. 01938, at 3).
269 See Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 351-53 (Wainwright, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (explaining that the majority decided the case based on TEX. GOV'T CODE §
552.102, which advocated the balancing test, while the Comptroller limited her argument
exclusively to § 552.101).
270 Id. at 349-50 (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
271 Id. at 349.
272 Id. at 357.
273 Id. at 349-50.
274 Id. 351-53 (arguing that waiver rules exist to prevent "unfair surprise" of issues to the
other party and to limit the courts' jurisdiction to "existing cases or controversies").
275 Id. at 353.
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information with other personal information to engage in identity
theft).27 6 Even if one were to look at the derivative use of that
information, empirical evidence was lacking to support the court's
claim that disclosure of date of birth information would lead to
identity theft.277 The reason the request of the Dallas Morning
News for date of birth information was legally sufficient was
because it allowed assessment of any criminal records of
employees. 278 More telling, structurally, was Justice Wainwright's
argument that, because the balancing standard had been
acknowledged as the proper legal standard for the first time by the
supreme court, "[w]e cannot expect a party to present evidence for a
standard unknown, unargued, and unapplied below. 279
Seven months later, the court issued its opinion in Texas
Department of Public Safety v. Cox Texas Newspapers, L.P.280
Pursuant to the Public Information Act, several Texas newspapers
requested detailed information concerning travel vouchers related
to Governor Rick Perry's security detail when he traveled outside
the state.28' The Department of Public Safety ("DPS") refused to
provide detailed information and requested an opinion from the
Attorney General. 28 2  The Attorney General concluded that
disclosure of the requested information "would place the governor in
imminent threat of physical danger."28 3  Consequently, the
information could be withheld pursuant to section 552.101.284
Because the travel expense information was characterized as
"core" public information, that information was protected from
disclosure only if it was "confidential under other law," that is, law
other than the Public Information Act. 28 5 The court held that "other
law" included a common law right to be free from physical harm,
citing an 1843 Republic of Texas case and a Texas case citing the
preeminent American tort law scholar William Prosser, and quoting
the venerable English legal authority William Blackstone. 2 6 The
276 Id. at 353-54.
277 Id. at 354-55.
278 Id. at 357.
279 Id. at 358.
280 Tex. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, 343 S.W.3d 112, 112 (Tex. 2011)
(decided July 1, 2011); Tex. Comptroller, 354 S.W.3d at 336 (decided Dec. 3, 2010).




285 Id. at 114 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 331
(Tex. 2001)).
286 Tex. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 115 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 125 (1769)) (citing Fisher v. Carrousel Motor
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court noted that the common law right to be free from physical
harm was "more ... entrenched in our common law than the right
[to] privacy."28 7  Because the common law right to privacy was
"other law" that protected documents from disclosure, the greater
entrenchment of the right to be free from physical harm created a
kind of transitive property effect. Thus, documents that infringed
that right to be free from physical harm should also be protected
from disclosure.288
The common law right to be free from physical harm led the court
to adopt the standard allowing nondisclosure in cases in which
there existed a "substantial threat of physical harm."28 9 Because
this was a newly created standard, the court remanded the case to
the trial court for it to "closely examine each of the disputed
documents."290 It did nod in the direction of the DPS by stating
that, in assessing security measures by looking at the vouchers
reflecting expenses for prior trips, "we cannot agree that
information from prior trips could not be used to inflict future
harm."291  This double negative requires some untangling. Of
course some person could use information from prior trips possibly
"to inflict future harm."292  In other words, it is theoretically
possible (or, to use more negative language, not impossible) that
disclosure of this information could lead to physical harm. But the
earlier-adopted standard was a "substantial" threat of physical
harm,293 a quantum certainly greater than a theoretical possibility.
Justice Wainwright concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the
case should be remanded to the trial court.294 He disagreed with the
court's analysis. As also happened in Texas Comptroller, Justice
Wainwright focused in part on the structural difficulties of the
court's opinion: "The [c]ourt should not judicially create an
exception to disclosure that contradicts the Legislature's expressed
intent in the [Public Information Act]." 295 His second disagreement
Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967); Benton v. Williams, Dallam 496, 496-97 (Tex.
1843).
287 Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 116.
288 See id. at 115-16.
289 Id. at 118. The court adopted identical statutory language from a 2009 amendment to
the Public Information Act that was formally inapplicable to core public information. Id. at
114-15 (citing Act of June 3, 2009, ch. 283, 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 742 (codified as
amended at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.151 (West 2012))).
290 Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 118.
291 Id. at 119.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 118.
294 Id. at 121 (Wainwright, J., concurrence).
295 Id.; see Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Atty. Gen. of Tex., 354 S.W.3d 336, 351-53
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was one of statutory interpretation. A 1999 legislative amendment
to the Public Information Act required disclosure of core public
information "unless [it is] expressly confidential under other law."296
C. Concurring Opinions
Chief Justice Jefferson's concurring opinions offer significant
evidence of his jurisprudence. He has written approximately twelve
concurrences since he became Chief Justice, 297 at least two in the
first two years as Chief Justice, 298 four in 2008,299 and six from 2009
through 2011.300 These opinions arise in relatively disparate areas
of law, but all suggest his pragmatic approach to interpreting law.
For example, one of his first concurrences concerned
interpretations of contract law.30 1 In 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich,
the majority adopted section 87(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts.3 2 Section 87(1)(a) declared the false recital of nominal
(Tex. 2010) (Wainwright, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
296 Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 343 S.W.3d at 123 (Wainwright, J., concurring) (quoting TEX
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.022 (West 1995) (amended 2011)).
297 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE!
(Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State
Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson). The search results were
only within the specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004 to December 31,
2011. See, e.g., Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 435 (Tex. 2011) (Jefferson, C.J.,
concurring); R.R. Comm'n v. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 633
(Tex. 2011) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring); Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658,
666 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Trammell Crow Cent.
Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 17 (Tex. 2008) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring); Diversicare
Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex. 2005) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment), 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154
S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
298 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE!
(Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State
Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson). The search results were
only within the specified time period defined above, September 14, 2004 to September 14,
2006. See, e.g., Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 842 (majority opinion) (deciding the case Oct. 14,
2005); Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 101 (majority opinion) (deciding the case Dec. 31, 2004).
299 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE!
(Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State
Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson). The search results were
only within the specified time period defined above, January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008.
See, e.g., Trammel, 267 S.W.3d at 9 (majority opinion) (deciding the case in 2008).
300 Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE!
(Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State
Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson). The search results were
only within the specified time period defined above, January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011.
See, e.g., Ojo, 356 S.W.3d at 421 (majority opinion) (decided May 27, 2011); R.R. Comm'n, 336
S.W.3d at 619 (majority opinion) (decided May 27, 2011); Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 658 (majority
opinion) (decided Aug. 27, 2010).
301 See Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 102.
302 Id. at 110; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a) (1979).
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consideration was sufficient to make an offer irrevocable in an
option contract. 30 3 Chief Justice Jefferson's concurrence urged the
court to take another step toward the reform of contract law and
hold that promises for an option in a commercial matter should be
enforceable without proof of any consideration. 30 4  Quoting the
authors of a leading treatise, the Chief Justice advocated the end of
consideration in such matters because such a rule avoided "fictional
charades [that] should not be a part of a mature legal system."30 5
The concurrence noted his proposed view was "hardly novel," having
been adopted by the English judge, Lord Mansfield in commercial
matters in late eighteenth century England, and proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1925.306 The "dogged insistence" on requiring a recital of
consideration was a harmful formalism that served no purpose in
commercial options contracts. 307
In Trammel Crow Central Texas, Ltd. v. Gutierrez, the issue was
the duty of landowners to protect invitees from criminal acts by
third parties. 308 The majority held that the no-duty rule applied to
the facts and reversed the court of appeals. 30 9 Luis Gutierrez and
his wife, Karol Ferman, were walking toward their car at the
Quarry Market in San Antonio after leaving a movie theater. 310
Luis was shot four times and died.311 His widow and mother sued
on their own behalf as well as in behalf of his five children, claiming
the owner negligently failed to provide adequate security.3 12 A jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded $5 million in
damages. 313 Plaintiffs offered testimony that the shooting was a
consequence of a robbery, and to prove their theory, offered evidence
that the police collected several items at the scene but not Luis's
wallet. 31 4 The defense claimed Luis was deliberately targeted and
killed for providing police information about several burglaries in
303 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a) (1979).
304 See Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 111 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
305 Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 5.17 (rev. ed. 1995)).
306 Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 112 (citing Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the
Preexisting Duty Rule and Its Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 401 n.314, 439 (1996)).
307 See Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 112-14.
308 Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 10-11 (Tex. 2008).




313 Id. at 12.
314 Id. at 11-12.
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which he had been involved. 315 Using a five-factor test, the court
held that Luis's murder was not foreseeable, and thus the defendant
lacked any duty to Luis to protect him from harm by third
parties. 316
In his concurrence for four members of the court, Chief Justice
Jefferson concluded the crime was foreseeable. 317 The plaintiffs
offered evidence of ten instances of violent crime at the Quarry
Market, all of which were robberies, in "the two years preceding
Gutierrez's death."318 Though the crime was foreseeable, that did
not give rise to a duty by the defendant to protect Gutierrez. 3 9 A
duty to protect persons from the criminal actions of third parties
arose only if the risk of criminal conduct was unreasonable.3 20 The
inquiry into the number of prior similar incidents to determine
whether it was unreasonable that an invitee could suffer harm at
the hands of a third party was misplaced. 321 Chief Justice Jefferson
instead urged the adoption of a balancing test that weighed the
possibility of the risk and likelihood of harm against the attendant
burdens on landowners. 322 In his weighing, the number of violent
incidents was "relatively few" and the burden upon landowners to
prevent a "brazen attack" was "tremendous."323 Thus, the defendant
did not owe plaintiff a duty in law.324
Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, released in August 2010,
was another tort law case, once again requiring the court to
interpret the now-superseded Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act ("IVLIIA"). 325 Irving Marks was injured while
attempting to get out of a hospital bed.326 He sued, claiming the
footboard of the bed was negligently assembled and maintained,
causing him to fall.327 The trial court held that Marks's claim was a
315 Id. at 12.
316 See id. at 12, 15, 17 (explaining that in order for the owner of the premises to have a
duty of care to protect people from criminal acts of third parties, the risk of harm must be
foreseeable, and in this case it was not, therefore no such duty existed).
317 Id. at 18 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
318 Id.
319 Id. at 18-19.
320 See id. at 18.
321 See id. at 18-19.
322 Id. at 18.
323 Id. at 19.
324 Id.
325 Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 658, 660 (Tex. 2010); see Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, ch. 817, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039
(repealed 2003) (codified as amended TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 4590i, § 1.01 (West
2012)).
326 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 660.
327 Id.
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health care liability claim as defined by the MLIIA. 328 Because
Marks failed to meet the requirements of the MLIIA (he failed to
file an expert report in a timely manner), his claims were
dismissed.329 The court of appeals reversed, holding Marks's claim
was not an MLIIA healthcare liability claim.330  In a per curiam
opinion, the Texas Supreme Court remanded the matter to the court
of appeals to evaluate the case in the light of the supreme court's
opinion in Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio.331  In
Diversicare, the issue was whether a resident of a nursing home,
who was sexually assaulted by another resident of the home, could
make claims of negligent supervision and failure to provide
reasonably safe premises outside of the MLIIA.332 The supreme
court held the claim was covered by the MLIIA, and the case was
dismissed because the claim was made after the two-year statute of
limitations window. 333 It did, however, conclude that premises-
liability claims that are "separable" from medical care liability
claims were not subject to the MLIIA. 334
On remand, a divided court of appeals affirmed the trial court.335
The case then returned to the supreme court, and in 2009 it held
Marks's claim was not a healthcare liability claim, but a premises-
liability claim.33 6 That opinion was withdrawn, 337 and the court
328 Id. The MLIIA defined a "[h]ealth care liability claim" as:
[A] cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of
treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care or health
care or safety which proximately results in injury to or death of the patient, whether the
patient's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art.
4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (West 2012) (repealed 2003).
329 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 661.
330 Id. at 660.
331 Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 575, 575 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)
(citing Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. 2005)), remanded to 229
S.W.3d 396 (Tex. App. 2007), affd, 319 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. 2010)).
332 Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 844-45.
33 Id. at 855.
334 See id. at 845, 851, 854 (noting that plaintiffs premise-liability claims were actually
healthcare liability claims, and that the court would not allow someone to portray their
healthcare liability claim as a premise-liability claim to avoid the statute of limitation
requirements of the MLIIA).
35 See Marks, 229 S.W.3d at 398.
336 Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676-77 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1 (Tex. Aug.
28, 2009), withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659. The withdrawn opinion is attached to Chief Justice
Jefferson's opinion in Marks. 319 S.W.3d at 676 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
337 Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659 (withdrawing opinion on
grant of rehearing Aug. 27, 2010).
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mulled the case for another year. 338 A plurality of the court held,
"[b]ecause the provision of a safe hospital bed was an inseparable
part of the health care services provided during Marks's
convalescence from back surgery, we conclude that his cause of
action for injuries allegedly caused by the unsafe bed is a health
care liability claim. 339
Chief Justice Jefferson's opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part in Marks was brief and to the point: Marks
inserted "discord" rather than "consistency" into Texas law. 340 It did
so because it both kept the initial conclusion in Marks that the
MLIIA was implicated "only if the underlying claim directly relates
to a patient's care and treatment" and abandoned the initial
conclusion that the hospital bed was separable from treatment. 341
The plurality, the Chief Justice noted, was required by the
Diversicare standard to "explain how a piece of wood at the end of a
bed is integral to medical care."342  The plurality had difficulty
meeting that duty because the 2009 withdrawn opinion had
"describe[d] in great detail why the footboard was not integral to St.
Luke's delivery of health care services to Marks."343 He then made
a classic slippery-slope argument, noting that Marks could have
fallen and injured himself from sitting on a defective chair in his
room, or a bedside table.344 "What if Marks fell down a 'rickety
staircase' while perambulating for the first time after surgery?"345
The ability to distinguish harms suffered because of a fall from a
rickety staircase from harms suffered when falling as a result of a
faulty footboard created both a formalism (what was integral to
medical care and what was incidental to a patient's care) that
lacked the clarity of categorical standards and a contextual
standard that used "overlapping" factors, making any assessment
more difficult.346  Because the court had applied the Diversicare
338 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 658-60 (majority opinion) (withdrawing the Aug. 28, 2009
opinion and re-deciding the issues on Aug. 27, 2010).
339 Id. at 666.
340 Id. at 675 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
341 Id. at 674.
342 Id. at 675.
343 Id.
344 Id. ('The footboard could as easily have been a chair in his room or a bedside table.").
315 Id. (quoting Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 854 (Tex. 2005)).
The reference to the rickety staircase was an example given by the majority in Diversicare in
response to Chief Justice Jefferson's opinion. See Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854. The
Diversicare court used this example to suggest why it adopted a rule allowing premises
liability claims for injuries separable from health care liability claims. See id.
346 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 675-76 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (quoting Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 680 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting
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standard, he would as well, concluding that, based on that
standard, the footboard was not "integral to or inseparable from the
health care services" the defendant provided to Marks. 347
The Chief Justice's opinion in Marks echoed his opinion in
Diversicare. As was true in Marks, he concurred in part and
dissented in part.348 His separate opinion in Diversicare proposed
another path. A health care liability claim was defined as "a cause
of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment,
lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted
standards of medical care or health care or safety."349
The legislature failed to define "safety," but provided that any
legal term should be interpreted consistently with the common
law. 350 The common law meaning of safety meant, "not exposed to
danger [and] not causing danger."351 To be free from danger was, in
his opinion, "without limitation."352  That meant free from the
danger of a sexual assault by another resident of the nursing home,
making Rubio's claim in Diversicare a healthcare liability claim
under the MLIIA. 353  'While it may be logical to read into the
statute a requirement that a safety related claim also involve[s]
health care," neither the implicit meaning of safety in the common
law, nor the explicit text of the MLIIA allowed such a reading. 354
Because courts "take statutes as they find them" 355 any complaints
about the expansive reach of the MLIIA were to be directed to the
legislature.
in part); Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801 (Tex. Aug. 28,
2009), withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659).
37 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 674; Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 855. Two student comments
discuss the problems arising from these two decisions. See Jonathan D. Nowlin, Comment,
Scalpel, Please: Why the Definitions of "Health Care Liability Claim" in Chapter 74 of the
Civil Practices and Remedies Code is Not as Clean-Cut as It Could Be, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1247, 1269-70 (2011) (discussing how the Texas Supreme Court's interpretation of Article
4590i in Marks and Diversicare offered guidance for the interpretation of Chapter 74); David
R. Schlottman, Note, In Critical Condition: Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, Marks
v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, and the State of Health-Care-Liability Claims in Texas, 63
BAYLOR L. REV. 526, 527-28 (2011) (discussing the problems arising from Diversicare and
Marks, including the inherent difficulties in distinguishing health-care liability claims from
premises-liability claims).
34 Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 855 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
149 Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.,
art. 4590i, § 1.03(a)(4) (West 2012) (repealed 2003).
350 See Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 860-61.
351 See id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1362 (8th ed. 2004)).
352 Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 861.
353 See id.
354 Id.
355 Id. (quoting Simmons v. Arnim, 220 S.W. 66, 70 (Tex. 1920)).
2011/2012] 2185
2186 Albany Law Review [Vol. 75.4
The Diversicare court rejected this option,356 which is why Chief
Justice Jefferson had joined the majority in the 2009 withdrawn
opinion in Marks.357 Now, it appeared, the court had changed its
mind to declare the footboard was "integral" or "inseparable" from
healthcare services. 35 8  This, he prophesied, would lead to
inconsistent results.359 And at least two Texas court of appeals
opinions issued since Marks have appeared to limit its applicability,
generating additional uncertainty. 360
The withdrawn 2009 opinion in Marks was decided by a 5-4
court.361 It was written by Justice Medina, and joined by Justices
Harriet O'Neill, Scott Brister, Paul Green, and Chief Justice
Jefferson. 362 The 2010 Marks decision was also written by Justice
Medina.363 His opinion was joined only by Justice Hecht.364 Parts I
and IV of Medina's opinion were joined by Justices Wainwright,
Johnson, and Willett, each of whom had dissented in the 2009
opinion.3 65 Between August 2009 and August 2010, Justices Brister
and O'Neill had left the court, replaced by Justices Eva Guzman
and Deborah Lehrmann, respectively. 366 The two new justices
effectively took the same position as their predecessors. Thus, the
356 See Diversicare, 185 S.W.3d at 854-55.
357 See Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658 app. at 676-77 (Tex. 2010)
(Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting in the withdrawn opinion that
the majority held the claim was a premises-liability claim instead of a healthcare liability
claim); Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1 (Tex. Aug.
28, 2009), withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659.
358 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 664 (majority opinion).
359 See id. at 675 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
360 See Nexus Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mathis, 336 S.W.3d 360, 370 (Tex. App. 2011) (holding
that claims against a treatment center for failure to inquire of its counselor's history of
sexually exploiting patients and failing to halt or prevent such exploitation of a former
patient were not healthcare liability claims); Cardwell v. McDonald, 356 S.W.3d 646, 649-50
(Tex. App. 2011) (holding that a claim that a psychiatrist deceptively engaged in "marriage
counseling" sessions with plaintiff to gain evidence harmful to her in divorce litigation with
her husband was not a healthcare liability claim).
361 Marks, 319 SW.3d app. at 676 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(demonstrating a 5-3 decision, with Justices Medina, O'Neill, Brister, Green, and Chief
Justice Jefferson in the majority, and Justices Johnson, Hecht, Wainwright, and Willett
making up the minority in the withdrawn 2009 opinion); Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1,
withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659.
362 Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(showing that Justices Medina, O'Neill, Brister, Green, and Chief Justice Jefferson were in
the majority, while Justices Johnson, Hecht, Wainwright, and Willett made up the minority
in the withdrawn 2009 opinion); Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 659.
363 Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 659.
364 Id.
365 Id.; Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676; Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319
S.W.3d 658.
a66 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 663; Marks, 319 S.W.3d 658 app. at 676; Marks, 2009 WL
2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319 S.W.3d 658.
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only person whose vote changed was Justice David Medina.3 67 The
decision by Chief Justice Jefferson to include the 2009 opinion as an
appendix to his separate opinion subtly informs the reader whose
(Justice Medina) opinion has shifted.3 68 Chief Justice Jefferson's
opinion remains resolutely professional, and offers a sense of the
Chief Justice's attention to the tensions and necessities of small-
group decision-making.
As seen in the Diversicare/Marks cases, the Texas Supreme Court
is regularly engaged in constructing and interpreting statutes. Its
members generally lean toward "originalist" approaches to
statutory interpretation, using dictionaries to fix the meaning of
words left undefined by statute, largely relying on plain meaning
interpretation and downplaying purposive statutory construction. 369
Chief Justice Jefferson generally follows this approach, as he did in
Diversicare and Marks.370 However, his approach to statutory
interpretation, on occasion, is both narrower and broader than that
taken by his colleagues. Two concurrences offer a sense of his
overarching understanding of statutory interpretation.
In Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe
Future & Clean Water, the statutory phrase that required
interpretation was "public interest."371 The Railroad Commission of
Texas was required by the Texas Water Code "to weigh the 'public
interest"' in determining whether to issue a permit for an oil and
gas injection well.372 The court held the Commission's interpretation
of "public interest" "was reasonable and in accord with the plain
language of the statute," and thus should be given deference by the
judiciary.373 Specifically, the question was whether the Commission
unreasonably interpreted "public interest" by failing to consider
367 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 659, 666 (showing Medina affirmed the court of appeals
opinion); Marks, 319 S.W.3d app. at 676-77 (showing that Justice Medina's opinion in 2009
reversed the court of appeals opinion); Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1, withdrawn, 319
S.W.3d 658.
368 See Marks, 319 S.W.3d at 676 et seq. (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
369 A study of the interpretive approaches taken by the two highest Texas courts is found
in Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1780, 1787-91 (2010).
370 See Marks, 319 SW.3d at 675 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(assigning the word "safety" a common meaning to help interpret its use in the statute);
Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 863-64 (Tex. 2005) (Jefferson, C.J.,
concurring) (interpreting the term "health care liability claim").
371 R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619,
621 (Tex. 2011).
372 Id.
373 Id. at 621.
2011/20121 2187
Albany Law Review
public safety concerns, including traffic safety, in deciding whether
to issue the permit. 374 Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean
Water opposed issuance of the permit because, it argued, trucks
carrying away waste-water would damage roads used by area
residents.375 The Commission issued the permit. 376 It concluded,
adopting the conclusion of its hearing examiners, that the public
interest was met because issuing the permit would increase the
amount of oil and gas recovered in the area and serve as an
economical way to dispose of salt water. 377 The court of appeals
held that the Commission abused its discretion by interpreting
"public interest" by considering just "the conservation of natural
resources."
378
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that if "a statutory term is
subject to multiple understandings [the court] should defer to an
agency's reasonable interpretation."379  Not only was "public
interest" left undefined by the legislature, the phrase was "anything
but clear and unambiguous." 380  Because the Commission
reasonably interpreted public interest by limiting itself to consider
"only ... matters within its expertise," its unwillingness to consider
traffic safety was reasonable under the statutory scheme set forth
in the Water Code. 381
It was the majority's conclusion that "public interest" was subject
to "multiple understandings" that led Chief Justice Jefferson to
write separately.38 2 Although "public interest" was "ambiguous as
to some conceivable set of facts,"383 it was not ambiguous in every
reading, and certainly not in this case. 38 4 The Water Code's text
and context prohibited the Commission to consider traffic safety.385
Thus, no deference was to be given to the Commission's
interpretation of the statute. 38 6
374 Id. at 623-24.
375 Id. at 622.
376 See id. at 623-24.
377 Id. at 622-23.
378 Id. at 623 (citing Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex.,
254 S.W.3d 492, 503 (Tex. App. 2007)).
379 R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619,
628 (Tex. 2011) (citing Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 747-48 (Tex. 2006)).
38o R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 336 S.W.3d at 628.
381 Id. at 630 (emphasis omitted).
382 Id. at 628 (majority opinion); id. at 633 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
383 Id. at 633 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
384 See id. at 634.
385 See id. ("[lPublic interest, in the context of the statute.., is limited to the consideration
of factors consistent with the chapter's purpose ... .
386 Id.
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Chief Justice Jefferson's mention of text and context illuminates
his concurring opinion two months later in Ojo v. Farmers Group,
Inc.3s7 The certified question from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was whether the Texas Insurance
Code prohibited an insurance company from pricing insurance
based on "a credit-score factor that has a racially disparate
impact."38 8  The court held that race-based credit scoring violated
the Code, but race-neutral credit scoring that generated a racially
disparate impact did not violate the Code. 38 9
The Chief Justice's concurring opinion begins: "Legislative history
is not always a villain."390 This introduction allows Chief Justice
Jefferson to explain both why the courts are "text-centric," and why
courts occasionally adopt extrinsic aids to statutory construction.391
This introduction leads to several eloquent statements about the
goals and purposes of a written legal opinion. 392 He initially writes
that an appellate opinion is "one part of a dialogue between parties,
citizens, legislators, and judges-a dialogue that provides a
historical record of the relevant controversy." 393
This dialogue, he continues, is presented to make the court's
opinion "more approachable to our readers and more easily
integrated into our social fabric."394 And that is because judges are
both "storytellers and historians."395 In one of his most trenchant
declarations, he writes, "[wle tell these stories because doing so is
crucial to our legitimacy."396 Because judgments of the court are
enforced through the "threat of state authority,"397 a narrative by
courts best legitimizes its actions. Citations to extrinsic aids tell
the reader "why," even when "why" is irrelevant to the court's
conclusion. The irrelevance of the legislature's intent to the court's
interpretation of the Insurance Code has relevance in another way:
"The inclusion of this history gives notice to those who feel wronged
387 See Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 S.W.3d 421, 35 (Tex. 2011) (Jefferson, C.J.,
concurring).
388 Id. at 422 (majority opinion); see Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 600 F.3d 1201, 1202-03 (9th
Cir. 2010).
389 Ojo, 356 S.W.3d at 422.
390 Id. at 435 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
391 Id. at 435-36.
392 Id. at 436-37.
393 Id. at 436.
394 Id. at 437.
395 Id.
396 Id. at 437.
397 Id. For a discussion on the violence inherent in the "threat of state authority" see
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1609-10, 1613 (1986).
2011/2012] 2189
2190 Albany Law Review [Vol. 75.4
by the statute."398  It offers a contextual history to buttress
"engagement in the political process" by those who "feel wronged."3 99
D. Dissenting Opinions
As is true of his concurring opinions, Chief Justice Jefferson has
dissented in a greater number of cases more recently than in his
earliest years as Chief Justice. After dissenting six times between
2004 through 2007,400 he has dissented thirteen times from 2008
through 2011.401 A significant number of these dissents may be
broadly categorized as tort matters. 40 2 Others concern practice and
procedure and statutory interpretation, or a combination of practice
and procedure in an underlying tort matter.
An early dissent demonstrates Chief Justice Jefferson's insistence
on the importance of process. In In re Allied Chemical Corporation,
a 5-4 court 40 3 held the issue before the court was not moot, and
898 Ojo, 356 S.W.3d at 437 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring).
399 Id. at 439.
400 See, e.g., HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627,
661 (Tex. 2007) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); In re Allied Chem.
Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 663 (Tex. 2007) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). Search Terms in
LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and DISSENT!
(Jefferson) Federal & State Cases, Combined: JUDGE! (Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson).
The search was limited to January 1, 2004-December 31, 2007.
401 See, e.g., Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2008)
(Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2008)
(Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Search Terms in LexisNexis: Texas Federal & State Cases,
Combined: OPINIONBY (Jefferson) and DISSENT! (Jefferson); Federal & State Cases,
Combined: OPINIONBY (Jefferson) and CONCUR! (Jefferson). The search was limited to
January 1, 2008-December 31, 2011.
402 I include product liability, medical malpractice, and class action matters, as well as two
cases that implicate First Amendment claims. See, e.g., Pleasant Glade, 264 S.W.3d at 2, 5-6
(involving an intentional tort and First Amendment claim); Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 300, 302
(regarding a class action product liability matter); HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 642
(litigating a First Amendment claim); In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 653 (describing
a class action tort claim). Chief Justice Jefferson's dissents include MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v.
Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 505 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting in part); Jelinek v. Casas,
328 S.W.3d 526, 541 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting in part); Garcia v. Gomez, 319
S.W.3d 638, 644 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Spectrum Healthcare Res., Inc. v.
McDaniel, 306 S.W.3d 249, 254 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Hernandez v. Ebrom,
289 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2009) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Pleasant Glade Assembly of God,
264 S.W.3d at 13 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299 (Jefferson, C.J.,
dissenting); HEB Ministries, Inc., 235 S.W.3d at 661 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 663 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting);
F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 694 (Tex. 2007) (Jefferson, C.J.,
dissenting); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 913 (Tex. 2004); Diversicare
Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 855 (Tex. 2005) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment); Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Hosp., 319 S.W.3d 658, 658, 674 (Tex. 2010) (Jefferson, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
403 See Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 654, 659 (showing a 5-4 majority decision,
written by Justice Brister and joined by Justice Hecht, Justice Medina, Justice Green, and
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created a procedural rule that, as stated by the Chief Justice, "for
the first time, creates an inactive docket for complex mass tort cases
like this one."404 The reason for the court's insistence may be found
in its characterization of the plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs alleged
''exposure to a 'toxic soup' of emissions in the air for many decades.
As we recently noted, no such claim 'has ever been tried or appealed
in Texas,' and thus 'the tort is immature."' 40 5
Chief Justice Jefferson's dissent concluded the matter before the
court was moot.40 6 Additionally, the Chief Justice suggested the
majority used the claim for mandamus relief to effect reform in
mass tort cases, a reform properly undertaken through either the
court's rulemaking process or through legislation. 40 7 Asking a series
of questions about the contours of this new rule, he concluded that
the court's answers "will be made on an ad hoc basis, with little
guarantee of predictability or uniformity."408
In another 5-4 case, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, the court
held the plaintiffs representing a class of millions lacked standing
to sue. 409 The named plaintiffs claimed that it was too easy to
unlatch the seatbelts on DaimlerChrysler vehicles, and demanded
that the manufacturer replace these seatbelts with others more
difficult to unlatch.410 Because the likelihood of injury was remote,
the majority held the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this class
action lawsuit.411
In dissent, Chief Justice Jefferson concluded the majority
conflated the issues of standing and the substantive merits of the
claim.412  Because Texas "law on warranty claims based on
unmanifested defects is unclear,"413 and because Texas's law of
standing required only a "real controversy ... determined by the
judicial declaration sought" by plaintiffs,41 4 both of which existed in
this case, the representatives of the class possessed standing to
Justice Wilet and a dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Jefferson and joined by
Justice O'Neill, Justice Wainwright, and Justice Johnson).
404 Id. at 664 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 654 (quoting In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 208 (Tex. 2004)).
406 Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 664 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
407 Id. at 665-66.
408 Id. at 666.
409 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 307-08 (Tex. 2008).
410 Id. at 300.
411 See id. at 301, 307-08.
412 Id. at 308 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
413 Id. at 309.






Both decisions emphasize the importance of process, especially as
an antidote to the rush to declare substantive law. In re Allied
Chemical Corporation arose in deep south Texas, 416 which many
Republicans and self-described tort reformers believe is one of the
Texas "judicial hellholes" where defense lawyers fear to tread. 417
Like Allied Chemical, Inman was a mass tort case. 418 In both cases
the majority viewed the claims with suspicion, or even disbelief. 419
But those substantive misgivings, the Chief Justice urged his
readers, were irrelevant to the procedural decisions that needed to
be made. 420
Two additional dissenting opinions deserve some attention. Both
cases concerned claims of religious liberty.421 HEB Ministries, Inc.
v. Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board is a prolix plurality
opinion concerning regulation of the awarding of "degree[s]" by a
"seminary."422  Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert
concerns an intentional tort claim against a religious institution
and several of its ministers, and a holding that significantly
expands immunity from tort liability available to religious
institutions. 423
In HEB Ministries, the issue was the constitutionality of a Texas
law requiring every post-secondary school to meet certain standards
before they may issue "degree[s]," including "associate," "bachelor,"
"master['s]," and "doctor[al]" degrees. 424  The law also required
certain standards be met before a school may call itself a
"seminary."425 The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board is
given the power to provide a "certificate of authority" to schools that
415 See DaimlerChrysler, 252 S.W.3d at 308, 316.
416 In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 654 (Tex. 2007).
417 ARIENS, supra note 2, at 282 (quoting LAWRENCE J. McQUILLAN & HOVANNES
ABRAMYAN, PAC. RESEARCH INST., U.S. TORT LIABILITY INDEX: 2008 REPORT 21 (2008)).
418 In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 653 (describing a class action tort claim);
Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 300, 302 (regarding a class action product liability tort matter).
419 See In re Allied Chemical Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 654, 656-57; Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 306.
420 See In re Allied Chemical Corp., 227 S.W.3d at 664-65 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting);
Inman, 252 S.W.3d at 313.
421 Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2008) (involving the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ.
Coordinating Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Tex. 2007) (discussing the state requirements
imposed on a private post-secondary school before they may be deemed a school involved in
religious education and training).
422 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 630.
423 Pleasant Glade, 264 S.W.3d at 5, 13 (majority opinion) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
424 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 630.
425 Id.
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meet these standards.426  A fractured court held the state
unconstitutionally preferred "one kind of religious instruction over
another" in violation of the Establishment Clause, favoring those
who were certified against those that were not.427 The plurality did
not simply declare unconstitutional the state's action restricting the
use of the word "seminary" to certified institutions. 428  It also
concluded the state impermissibly endorsed certain religious
institutions, allowing only those certified institutions to use the
phrase "bachelor's" diploma.429 In a part of the opinion joined by a
majority, including Chief Justice Jefferson, the opinion also held
restricting the use of the word "seminary" to certified religious
institutions violated the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Employment Division v.
Smith.430  A fractured plurality also held unconstitutional, as
violating of the Free Exercise Clause, the state's limitations on the
use of the word "degree."431
As the Chief Justice notes, the plurality strains to make this an
Establishment Clause case. 432 It can only do so by concluding that
the Coordinating Board favors some "religious" entities, which
prejudices HEB Ministries. 433 This, of course, would better fit an
Equal Protection Clause argument. On the plurality's Free
Exercise analysis and the state's restriction of the use of the word
"degree," his dissent notes that state law is not motivated by
religious animus, but is merely a neutral, generally applicable law
constitutional under Supreme Court precedent. 434 Ockham's Razor
works well here. The plurality, the dissent indicates, must engage
in a "strained reading of the record and the case law"435 to conclude
the law restricts communication of religious beliefs, which allows it
to call the case a "hybrid" case that returns the court to "compelling
interest" analysis,436 which Employment Division v. Smith so
carefully cabined.437 A simpler explanation is that the law was
426 Id. at 631.
427 See id. at 630, 645, 657 (displaying a "fractured" court also).
428 Id. at 645, 657.
429 See id. at 630, 632 (showing that the majority of the court shared this opinion).
430 See id. at 630, 650, 654, 657 (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)).
431 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 630, 657-58, 661 (displaying that the court was
fractured).
432 Id. at 662, 665-66 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
433 Id. at 665-66 (quoting State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683
S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. 1984)).
434 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 666.
435 Id. at 667.
436 Id. at 667-68.
437 Id. (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79, 881 (1990)).
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designed to protect Texans from "diploma mills" and from confusion
about which educational documents should be understood as
reflecting a "degree" (whether an associate, bachelor's, master's, or
doctoral).438
In Pleasant Glade, the court held the church was not judicially
estopped from making an appeal on religious liberty grounds. 439 As
it would be tried, the matter was "an ecclesiastical dispute over
religious conduct that would unconstitutionally entangle the court
in matters of church doctrine."440 It dismissed the matter, holding it
lacked jurisdiction. 441
Everyone agreed that members of the church physically
restrained the plaintiff, seventeen-year-old Laura Schubert, on two
separate occasions.442 Whether this touching was a forcible battery
and false imprisonment was the factual question before the jury.443
At the trial on her then-existing claims, the jury decided that
question of fact in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her damages. 444
Before the trial, the church moved to dismiss the Schuberts's (her
parents joined her as plaintiffs) suit on First Amendment grounds,
claiming this was "a dispute regarding how services should be
conducted within a church, including the practice of 'laying on of
hands."'445 The trial court denied the motion.4 46 In a mandamus
proceeding before the court of appeals on that decision, all claims
other than false imprisonment and assault (including, among
others, professional negligence and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims) were dismissed as religious claims
because they required an inquiry into the beliefs of the Pleasant
Glade Assembly of God.447 The church acknowledged that Laura's
bodily injury claims were secular claims. 448
After the decision of the court of appeals was rendered, the trial
court issued a protective order prohibiting the plaintiffs from
making any inquiry into the religious beliefs of the defendants, and
ordered the parties to avoid speaking of any spiritual matters at
438 HEB Ministries, 235 S.W.3d at 668-69.
439 Pleasant Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert, 264 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2008).
440 Id. at 2.
441 See id. at 2, 9.
442 See id. at 3-4.




447 Id. at 5-6.
448 Id. at 7.
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trial.449 On appeal, defendants claimed that the judgment should be
reversed on First Amendment grounds. 450 The court of appeals held
the church was judicially estopped from making this argument
based on its prior mandamus filing.451 The Texas Supreme Court
held judicial estoppel inapplicable because its allegedly inconsistent
arguments were made in the same proceeding, not a prior
proceeding, because the church gained no advantage from making
the arguments it did, and, most importantly, because the church
had consistently claimed a defense based on religious liberty
grounds.452
Once judicial estoppel was out of the way, the court headed to the
church's religious liberty claim. In the court's view, Laura
Schubert's claim was "not about her physical injuries."45 3 Her claim
was essentially an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim,
a claim that had already been dismissed. 454 Because the church
espoused the practice of physically laying hands upon other
congregants as part of its religious belief system, and because
Laura's emotional injuries were entwined with the church's
religious beliefs, the case had to be dismissed.455
The dissent of Chief Justice Jefferson, as expected, began with his
assessment of the court's judicial estoppel analysis. He noted that
because the court dismissed for a want of jurisdiction the judicial
estoppel issue was beyond its mandate. 456 Second, the court's
rejection of the judicial estoppel conclusion threatened judicial
integrity, for it allowed a party to take inconsistent legal positions,
suggesting a court was misled on at least one of those occasions. 457
And the court's insistence otherwise was formalistic.
On the religious liberty claim, the Chief Justice clarifies facts he
believes were obfuscated by the court. First, Schubert claimed
physical as well as emotional injuries. 458 Second, when she was
initially physically restrained, congregants did so for two hours, not
mere moments. 459 Third, Pleasant Glade did not ask that the court
instruct the jury to segregate physical and emotional damages,
449 Id. at 5.
450 Id. at 6-7.
451 Id. at 7.
452 Id. at 6.
453 Id. at 8.
454 Id.
455 Id. at 10-11.
456 Id. at 14 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
457 Id.
458 Id. at 15-16.
459 Id. at 15.
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which waived that issue on appeal. 460 As a legal matter, the court
failed to explain how a submission of Schubert's emotional damages
claims would inquire "into the truth or falsity of the religious
beliefs" of the defendants. 461  Tort law allows an award for
emotional damages "for [an] intentional tortf involving [a] physical
invasion[]." 462  Why this battery and false imprisonment case is
analogized to an intentional infliction of emotional distress case is
unclear to the dissent. 463
The dissent does make clear that what the court is holding is that
the First Amendment prohibits "claims for emotional damages
arising from assault, battery, false imprisonment, or similar torts,"
a holding for which it can cite no other case in support. 464 The Chief
Justice then cites a litany of cases stating that religious liberty does
not exempt a defendant from a claim of physical assault.465 Doing
so in this case was not only making law, but making bad law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of Chief Justice Jefferson follows the best
traditions of judging. One of the nation's greatest judges, Benjamin
N. Cardozo, gave the Storrs lectures at Yale Law School in 1921,
published the same year, and entitled The Nature of the Judicial
Process.466 He was fifty-years-old, with a formidable reputation. 467
His goal was practical, to explain what judges do in making
decisions. 468 The problem facing the judge, he wrote, was "in reality
a twofold one: he must first extract from the precedents the
underlying principle, the ratio decidendi; he must then determine
the path or direction along which the principle is to move and
develop, if it is not to wither and die."469  Two ways in which
460 Id. at 15-16.
461 Id. at 16.
462 Id.
463 See id. at 15-17.
464 Id. at 17.
465 Id.
466 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 3, 6 (1921). A study of
Cardozo's Storrs lectures is found in ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 199-222 (1998).
467 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 80 fig. 1 (1990) (noting
numbers of citations to opinions written by Cardozo and by other members of the New York
Court of Appeals in 1914); Benjamin N. Cardozo, Judges, THE HIST. SOC'Y OF THE CTS. OF THE
ST. OF N.Y., http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/cardozo.htm (last visited May 15, 2012).
Cardozo was born in 1870 in New York. Id.
468 See CARDOZO, supra note 467, at 9-13 (explaining the process of judicial decision-
making).
469 Id. at 28.
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principles were developed were history and philosophy. 470
The opinions written by Chief Justice Jefferson meet both of
Judge Cardozo's goals. They seek the "underlying principle" of the
law and illuminate a path for that principle. Of course, much of the
work of state appellate judges presently involves statutory
interpretation, which Cardozo's lectures noted, but to which he paid
relatively little attention.471  Chief Justice Jefferson's opinions
regularly interpret statutes and his explanations of the court's
methodology and the social utility of such opinions is candid and
considered.
Chief Justice Jefferson will turn forty-nine in summer 2012,472
having already served on the Texas Supreme Court for eleven
years. 473 He justifiably enjoys a strong reputation for sagacity and
thoughtfulness. He is a judge in full.
470 Id. at 30-31. The other two were custom, which Cardozo called the "method of
tradition," and "the mores of the day," which he called the "method of sociology." Id.
471 See id. at 69-70.
472 Biography, supra note 3 (stating that Chief Justice Jefferson was born on July 22,
1963).
473 Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, supra note 1 (explaining that Jefferson was
appointed to the court in March 2001 by Governor Perry).
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